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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemp orary Affairs by the Editor

The Rather-Bush Affair
One would probably have to go all the way back to
Roger Mudd's famous interview with Ted Kennedy
before the 1980 election-when Kennedy could only
respond with mumblings and incoherencies to Mudd's
questions on everything from Chappaquiddick to his
qualifications for the presidency-to find anything
comparable to the extraordinary exchange late last
month between Dan Rather and George Bush on the
CBS Evening News. The Rather/Bush confrontation differed radically in tone from the earlier one (Kennedy
was passive in response to aggressive questioning,
Bush quite the reverse) and its impact may turn out
not to be comparable, but it did provide in its own
right a compelling moment of political theater. It also
provides an occasion for brief reflection on the relationship between politicians and journalists.
First, the incident itself. Despite CBS's protests to
the contrary, the evidence strongly supports Bush's
claim that he was unfairly set up. The original letter
from the network on the matter spoke of a "political
profile," and while the Vice President had every
reason to expect close questioning on the Iran-contra
affair as part of the interview, he had legitimate cause
to complain of the exclusive preoccupation with that
issue which he in fact encountered. Not enough attention has been paid in this regard to the network's
three-minute lead-in to the interview itself. It not only
focused solely on the Iran-contra matter but did so in
a hostile and prosecutorial manner, consisting as it did
of a series of rapid-fire charges of the "Bush has
claimed ... but the record shows" variety. There is no
reason to suppose that Bush's appearance of outrage
when he came on camera was anything other than
genuine. When Rather's questioning continued the
tone of antagonistic cross-examination, Bush responded in kind and the verbal battle-details of
much 'of it lost with each man trampling on the words
of the other-was on.
We needn't, of course, be excessively protective of
politicians. Bush was no doubt prepared for every
eventuality, and once the nastiness started, he gave as
good as he got. His reference-irrelevant to the moment but rhetorically effective-to the notorious incident in which Rather walked off the set in a huff
when the network let a sports event cut into the news
hour and left CBS with several minutes of dead air
had apparently been prepared in advance if the occaFebruary, 1988

sion required. Bush has in fact developed a technique
of taking the offensive on the Iran-contra affair by accusing aggressive questioners of unfair treatment.
There's more than a hint of calculation there, but the
fact remains that in this case the Vice President had a
legitimate complaint. Rather and CBS would have
been far more effective in their quite proper attempt
to pursue Bush's role in Iran-contra had they not
turned the occasion into an inquisition. As it is, they
handed the Vice President a political benefit, particularly among Republican conservatives for whom CBS
in general and Rather in particular represent the heart
of a media establishment out to do them in.
Rather went wrong when he turned himself from a
commentator on the political scene to a protagonist
within it. It is not just that he was uncivil and inappropriately aggressive-though he was both those
things-but that his personal outbursts ("You've made
us hypocrites before the whole world") and his contemptuous dismissal of Bush at the end made him
seem more a rival candidate for office than one standing, as someone in his position should, outside the
political drama. Rather has done this sort of thing before, and one wonders when someone at his network
will provide him the necessary instruction on his appropriate relation to the news it is his job to report.
Can anyone imagine Walter Cronkite engaging in such
an attempt at political mugging?
The foregoing comments should not be taken as a
general assault on either Dan Rather or CBS News.
Rather in fact is most of the time a first-rate anchorman, and the CBS Evening News, in our view, consistently outperforms its network rivals in journalistic
competence.
The point instead has to do with the attitude journalists should take toward the politicians they cover.
We rightly expect from the media in such circumstances intelligence, diligence, and a dispassionate
attitude that lapses neither into credulity nor cynicism.
We do not-or should not-expect of reporters that
they take on the role of the political opposition . When
they do so they mistake their function and distract
themselves and us from the proper concerns of political journalism.
Serious and close questioning of candidates for public office? Of course. Badgering and blood sports? Not
at all-or not, at least, if journalists expect to hold our
respect.

••
••
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Arthur Keppei-Jones

SOUTH AFRICA: NO SOLUTION?
Reflections on Richard John Neuhaus' Dispensations

The South African problem is so complex that many
outside observers refuse to believe it. It is seen as a
simple question of the oppression of the black majority
by a white majority. It certainly is that; but if it were
no more than that it might even be solved by some of
the nostrums advocated with so much rhetoric by the
world's politicians. In fact, there are more than two
players, and the goal posts are dotted irregularly all
over the field. It is in the interest of many of the players to obscure this fact. Many observers come away
from the scene, therefore, with confused, contradictory, and mistaken impressions.
One of the most useful books on South Africa to be
published in recent years is Dispensations: the Future of
South Africa as South Africans See It, by Richard John
Neuhaus (Eerdmans, 1986). This book traces the confusion to its source, the South Africans themselves,
and judges it with fine perception and insight. The
writer does not thrust himself or his opinions on the
reader. He has interviewed many people from all parts
of the political spectrum; his own contribution is crossexamination and a critical assessment of what his subjects have said. Thus the confusions in South African
minds, and the flat contradictions between one witness
and another, are brought into focus.
What follows are some thoughts, buttressed by evidence from this book, on the conflicts among the
numerous racial and ethnic groups, and within each of
them, and even the contortions within individual
minds, as they contemplate their options.
In the days of Ian Smith's Rhodesia it used to be

Arthur Keppei-Jones, now retired from the Department of
History at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, is a native of South Africa. He has written many books on the history and politics of southern Africa, the most recent of which,
Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902 (MeGill-Queen's University Press and
University of Natal Press, 1983), has just been reprinted.
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said that the definition of a "loyal Rhodesian" was
"one who could not sell his house." The definition has
a kind of bearing on South Africa. Those who see no
hope for the country leave it, if they can. Those who
stay, willingly or not, are forced to hope. So some
hope for revolution, others for the status quo. The
confusion and contradiction arise, I think, largely
from the horrifying if unacknowledged realization that
this problem has no solution.
No solution? Neuhaus quotes from a report of the
constitutional committee of the President's Council: "in
foreseeable circumstances in South Africa, the perceived interests of Whites and Blacks are hardly likely
to change so as to persuade either population group
that its vital interests would be sufficiently promoted
and protected by the other." That was as near to "no
solution" as a committee charged with finding the solution could go.
The people quoted in this book share with most
South Africans who have written or spoken about
their problem one curious weakness. They can be specific in pointing to the evils of the present system. But
when they have to say what they would put in its place
they either become vague or offer plans that are based
not on reality but on fantasy. The explanation of this,
and of the confusion generally, is found in the particular circumstances of each racial and ethnic group.
Johnny Makatini, the A.N .C.'s chief observer at the
United Nations at the time he was interviewed for the
book, seemed perfectly confident and clear in speaking to Neuhaus: "there is only one future and that future is ours; whatever happens we win." What could
be less confusing? Makatini represented an African
National Congress which, after generations of polite
protests and moderate demands which brought no response, had decided that nothing short of violent revolution would do. The population figures (74 per cent
black) would make his confidence seem plausible. But
there is a catch in it: who are "we"?
Makatini, I would guess, was confusing the A.N.C.
with the black population as a whole. The A.N .C.
The Cresset

claims to be the sole legitimate representative of that
population. Identifying one with the other is a good
revolutionary posture but a misleading guide to postrevolutionary politics. The blacks have other organizations and leaders, opposed to the A.N.C. After a revolution these divisions would be important; therefore
they are important to the participants while the revolution is still only in prospect.
Some of the opponents of the A.N.C. are equally
revolutionary, but like the Pan-Africanist Congress
emphasize black nationalism in opposition to the
A.N.C.'s anti-racism. But the more important rival
movements are opposed to "the revolutionary option."
Neuhaus rightly devotes much space to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who is Chief Minister of KwaZulu
(a non-independent "homeland") but is widely followed and revered by Zulus outside the homeland as
well. The Zulus number six million, are the biggest
ethnic group (they prefer to call it a "nation") in the
country, have an intense national pride, and in their
heyday played in black South Africa the role of a
"master race." No one knows how many Zulus, if the
chips were down, would follow Chief Buthelezi in opposition to other black leaders and parties, but I have
been given the figure of three million.
Buthelezi has strengths and weaknesses, as Neuhaus
notes. He has many white as well as Zulu admirers.
The whites perceive him as a "moderate," and he has
continued to oppose divestment, sanctions, and revolution. He prefers negotiation , and since Dispensations
was written has brought one important negotiation to
a successful conclusion. On the other hand his political
organization, Inkatha, does not use kid glove methods
in dealing with its opponents. It has many of these, because the supporters of other black movements regard
Buthelezi as, next to the government itself, the chief
enemy of their struggle.
An entirely different kind of "enemy of the struggle," though it is not so described, is the Zion Christian Church, the largest of the black independent
churches. Its members are opposed to violence of any
kind, and therefore to the policy of the A.N.C. Their
numbers are variously estimated, but are at least two
million, and may be nearer to three. Even if we allow
for some overlap (there can't be much) between these
Zionists and the followers of Buthelezi, we have quite
a few million blacks who after the revolution would be
opposed to the A.N.C. As some of the revolutionaries,
and almost all the other racial groups, would be on
that side too, the confidence of the A.N.C. may not be
as solidly based as it would like.
Nevertheless there is no doubt that the blacks, of all
shades of opinion, are grievously oppressed and repressed. Because it is perceived-partly as a result of
February, 1988

the government's own paranoia-as the leading opponent of the regime, the A.N.C. would probably get a
majority in a free vote with universal suffrage. But it
would not be the kind of majority that its rhetoricians
like to imagine, and the free vote is not an immediate
prospect.
These divisions can be seen, though they are not
emphasized, in the statements of various people interviewed by Neuhaus. They help to explain the jaunty
confidence, the rhetoric, the omissjons, the vagueness
and the double-talk on the revolutionary side. But
there are other factors in the explanation, and the
confusion becomes more confused as we move from
the 74 per cent group to the various minorities.

Some of the opponents of the A.N.C.
are equally revolutionary, but like
the Pan-Africanist Congress emphasize
black nationalism in opposition to
the A.N.C.'s anti-racism. But the
more important rival movements are
opposed to "the revolutionary option."

The Afrikaners are the chief of these. Though a
minority of the whole population, they are a majority
of the enfranchised (i.e. white) population, and have
had a monopoly of power for nearly forty years. T heir
power is pervasive, reaching down to the pettiest concerns of life. Under the present "dispensation," that is
to say the state of emergency, they have almost unlimited control over everyone's life and freedom, over
television and radio (their propaganda machine), over
what may be published in the press-and the list could
go on and on. Their armed forces are the most powerful south of the Sahara. A leading Progressive said
to me in 1986, "Don't believe that the revolution is j ust
round the corner. The government hasn't even begun
to use the power at its disposal." But about these
monopolizers of power the same question arises as in
the case of the blacks: who are "they"?
Twenty years ago it was almost possible to regard
the Afrikaner people, the National Party, and the
Dutch Reformed Church as different aspects of the
same thing. It is not possible now. Secessions from the
National Party have provided other political homes,
chiefly the Conservative Party, for Afrikaners of the
far right. An ecclesiastical schism has followed. On the
other hand the fear, fostered by government propaganda, of black and red revolution has driven many
English-speaking whites to support the National Party.
5

In the general election of May, 1987, they were said
to have voted for it "in droves." Their votes were welcome, but the National Party remains an Afrikaner institution; very many of its members would feel very
uncomfortable if it did not. It must always be remembered that the party was formed in 1914 primarily to
oppose the English, not the blacks. That tradition has
been modified , but not abandoned .
The Afrikaners, however, are no longer afraid of
the English. They fear whatever threatens their national identity and existence, and that now means the
blacks. How can the Afrikaners remain a separate and
independent nation if they are scattered among a
huge black majority enjoying, in the words of the slogan, "one man , one vote, in a unitary state"? The Afrikaners of the far right, in the Conservative Party and
various cultural and even Nazi-like bodies such as the
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or A.W.B . (which went
into mourning for Rudolf Hess), have a simple answer: they cannot do so. Therefore white supremacy
must be enforced in all its rigor.
As a long-term policy, this belongs to the realm of
fantasy . The leaders, and perhaps most of the articulate followers, of the National Party understand this;
yet they fear the danger also. Professor Gerrit Olivier
of Pretoria described the dilemma: "most of us recognize that the idea of white control over others doesn't
accord with the morals of our society. That is the
cause of our bad conscience, and we are terribly torn
over what to do about it."
Dispensations was being written at the time when the
government was making its most dramatic attempt to
square the circle. A new constitution was introduced .
(It is in the Afrikaner, and now the South African, tradition that constitutions are made , so can be unmade,
by ordinary legislative enactment.) There were to be
three houses of Parliament and an executive presidency. The House of Assembly remained as before,
representing whites only; the House of Representatives was "Coloured" (mixed race) in both membership
and constituency, and the House of Delegates Indian.
There was no house for blacks.
Most of the complexities must be omitted here, but
some essential points must be noted. In addition to the
cabinet at the top of the structure there were other
cabinets for each of the three houses. The whole business of government and legislation was divided into
"general affairs" and "own affairs. " "Own affairs" were
the business of each house separately, and of its
cabinet; "general affairs" of all the houses and of their
common cabinet. Education, for example, was an "own
affair"; thus white, Coloured, and Indian education
belonged to different jurisdictions, and there was no
way of providing for schools that were not racially
6

segregated. In the election of the President the three
houses participated , but the numbers were so arranged that the decision really lay with the majority
party (the National Party has a big majority) in the
white chamber. The same arithmetical principle resolved, either directly or through the power of the
President, differences among the houses.
The system was trumpeted as a great step in
"power-sharing," whereas, as can be seen, all the
power remained where it was before, though somewhat more concentrated in the hands of the President.
And there was not even a pretense of sharing it with
blacks. It was this last omission that precipitated the
riots that have now continued for over three years. A
minority of Nationalist politicians, and many Afrikaners to the left of that party, realize that genuine
power-sharing with all other groups is urgently necessary, but they have not been able to show how this can
be reconciled with guarantees for the Afrikaners, or
the whites generally. Nor can they offer a program
that would not stampede white voters into the camp,
or laager, of the far right.
This difficulty has resulted in a semantic curiosity
which was pointed out to me in 1986 by a prominent
newspaper editor. The government describes its threechamber system, and indeed any incorporation of nonwhite persons into the political structure, as "powersharing," whereas the National Party has kept all the
power in its own hands, and has no intention of giving
any of it up. When some white liberals go to Lusaka
or Dakar for a meeting and discussion with members
of the A.N.C., the government and its press call this
"negotiating" with the A.N.C. The government's own
talk of "negotiating" with black leaders could therefore
mean no more than discussion, in which at the end
those leaders would merely be informed of what was
going to be done. The linguistic confusion is the result
of trying to do two mutually incompatible things.
So the blacks have the numbers and, in some way
that is still obscure, the future. The Afrikaners have
the power, and are masters of the present. Both
groups are politically divided, but if a violent confrontation came both would be more united as they came
down to the wire. And each would unite behind its
own extremists. The rabble-rousing demagogue who
leads the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging has said that
in the end there will be only two parties, the A.N.C.
and the A.W.B. Yet on each side there is a recognition
by some people that the hostility is misplaced and
tragic: the Afrikaners are Africans too, "the white
tribe of Africa."
Between 35 and 40 per cent of the whites are English-speaking. Though this is the community from
which I myself sprang, I must say that Neuhaus is
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probably right in playing it down in his book. The English cannot play a decisive role in South African politics. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
they were dominant politically, culturally, and economically in the Cape Colony and Natal. (Neuhaus refers
to an "aristocracy.") Then the Afrikaners took over.
Though the English have had no political influence
since 1948, and very little since 1924, their mind-set
inherited from the past has not greatly changed. "A
sense of superiority" may be slightly too strong a
phrase, but there is absolutely no sense of inferiority
or humiliation. Beyond that it is hard to generalize
about them. Because they, their culture, and their language are second-class in South Africa but dominant
in the world at large, there has long been a tendency
among English South Africans to emphasize, in their
own minds, their membership in that larger world.

That is one of the reasons why the
English are politically weak: they do
not have their backs to the wall. The
other reason is that they are caught
in the middle, between traditional
fear of Afrikaner Nationalism and
the new fear of African Nationalism.

To quote Johnny Makatini again, "The Afrikaner is
not black like I am but he is as much an African. I
watch them when they come to New York and you can
see they feel the way we do, they are not at home
here, they know they belong to Africa. It's not that
way with the Enlgish, they fit right in here. I watch
them, I tell you. You can pick up the English and put
them anywhere and they think they own the world."
There is some exaggeration there, and too much
generalization. Many of the English do feel that they
belong to Africa. But, on the whole, Makatini has it
right. I, who write this, am a Canadian citizen, believe
that I "fit right in here," and am only one of a huge
English South African diaspora spread over the whole
English-speaking world. The English, as Neuhaus puts
it, still have boats in the harbor. The Afrikaners and
the Indians burnt theirs long ago, and the rest never
had any.
That is one of the reasons why the English are politically weak: they do not have their backs to the wall.
The other reason is that they are caught in the middle. Their political history has been one of resistance
to Afrikaner Nationalism, in which they have been
helped and led by anti-Nationalist Afrikaners such as
February, 1988

J.C. Smuts. But now they look over their shoulders
and see the still greater threat of African Nationalism.
As long as this threat was remote, the English for the
most part prided themselves on their liberal attitudes
to race relations. As the threat comes closer, the
liberalism of many evaporates, while that of a few
turns to radicalism.
Thirty years ago virtually all the English supported
the United Party, which had been the party of Smuts.
That party died an inglorious death in the election of
1987, by which time its place in the English community had been taken by the Progressive Federal Party.
This, unlike the old U.P., is explicitly liberal, but as it
is the only predominantly (though by no means
wholly) English party, its supporters range over a very
wide political spectrum. In 1987 the P.F.P. was caught
on the horns of the same kind of dilemma that has
tortured the other groups. It had to stand by its principles, yet appeal to white voters. It seemed to prevaricate. Radicals deserted it-by not voting in the election. Its most conservative former supporters voted
Nationalist.
The P.F.P. had previously been deserted by its own
leader, Dr. van Zijl Slabbert, and some other prominent members, who decided that only extra-parliamentary opposition was now relevant. This desertion had
not happened when Dispensations was being written, so
we have no late-1986 interview with Dr. Slabbert. But
we are given insights into that extra-parliamentary,
mostly black, opposition, which fights a running battle
against arrests, banning, and censorship. Most of these
organizations are joined under the umbrella of the
United Democratic Front, which the government regards as no more than a "front" for the A.N.C.
Perhaps sensing what was to come, Neuhaus paid
very little attention to the P.F.P., though the party was
at the height of its euphoria in 1985; it was not till
1987 that commentators began to prophesy its doom.
In Dispensations there are brief encounters with van Zijl
Slabbert but none with Helen Suzman. Some people
would say that the P.F.P. is becoming as irrelevant as
the English-speaking community which provides most
of its supporters. This is unfair, because the
Nationalists still rule the country, Parliament is the
place where they can be held to account for their misdeeds, and it is the P.F.P. that probes and exposes.
But there will never be a P.F.P. government.
The problem would be a little less complex than it
is if the population consisted entirely of the divided
blacks and the divided whites. But there are two other
groups, the "Coloured" and the Indians. The Coloured are mainly concentrated in the western part of
the Cape Province, and the Indians in Natal, chiefly in
and around Durban. There is also a significant Indian
7

community in the Transvaal.
The Coloured are usually described as being distinct
from the blacks because they are of mixed race, but
the important distinction is cultural. The blacks speak
various Bantu languages and retain in varying degrees
their old indigenous values and customs. The Coloured have none of this. Most are Afrikaans-speaking,
Christian, and share the values and lifestyle of the
whites, though there is much that is distinctively
their own.
In the past they felt close to the whites and distant
from the blacks. Today the political leaders insist that
all who are not white are black, but this is just another
of the myths. Successive Nationalist governments since
1948 have gone to great lengths, committing cruelties
and illegalities, to deprive the Coloured people of the
rights they had enjoyed. Now there is a revulsion. The
Coloured are referred to as "Brown Afrikaners,"
which is what they had previously assumed they were.
Why add 8. 7 per cent of the population to the black
political column when it could be in the white? ·
Hence the House of Representatives, launched with
a great flourish in 1984. As we have seen, it has no
real power. What those people had before 1955 was
votes on the common roll for the House of Assembly,
but only in the Cape Province. (Most of them lived in
that province anyway.) Therefore the new scheme was
a sham, and was generally rejected by the Coloured
people. When the House was elected, only 31 per cent
of the eligible voters cast votes. (In the Cape peninsula, where the Coloured people are most concentrated, sophisticated, and politicized, the percentage
poll was 11.) Thus the Representatives were not representative.
The hostility to the new constitution was due partly
to its being, for the Coloured people, a sham, and
partly to its exclusion of the blacks. The Coloured
community in general supports the extra-parliamentary
opposition. Come the revolution, however, it would almost certainly be deeply divided. The vision of the
"Brown Afrikaner" will not fade.
If there is fear of the black majority in the hearts
of many Coloured people, there is still more among
the Indians. They know what the blacks did to the Indians in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa. In 1949
there was a murderous riot in Natal, blacks venting
their rage on Indians in their capacities of landlords,
employers, and creditors. The memory and fear of
1949 have remained vivid.
A rich Indian merchant, asked by Neuhaus with
which side the Indians would be aligned "when the
crunch comes," replied "with the whites, of course, not
the blacks." But it would be important to be on the
winning side, which means getting a "certificate" from
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the blacks that the Indians were on their side before
the revolution. Thus the Indian students, generally
more radical and revolutionary even than black students, may serve their own community well. Perhaps
all this throws some light on the elections for the
House of Delegates: the percentage of registered voters that voted was 20; of all qualified voters, 16.
The national motto of South Africa, ex unitate vires,
has a hollow ring now; there is neither unity nor
strength. They will not be conjured up by the African
nationalist slogan "one man, one vote, in a unitary
state." To this the A.N.C. has added its firm opposition to guarantees for minorities. In a free election, as
I have said, the A.N.C. would probably in the first instance turn out to be the majority. All of the rest, of
all races, colors, and political opinions, would be
minorities.

The fate of minorities in many black
states in Africa suggests that the
onus is on the A.N.C. to show why
"it can't happen here." Mere promises
of good will are not going to be
trusted by those who now have power
and are asked to give it up.
The fate of minorities-political, ethnic, or religious-in many black states suggests that the onus is
on the A.N.C. to show why "it can't happen here. "
Mere promises of good will are not going to be trusted
by those who now have power and are asked to give
it up. Still less will they give it up if the A.N .C., or any
combination of African nationalists, is seen to want
power for the purpose of doing to the whites what the
present government has done to the blacks.
As the gap between rich and poor in South Africa
comes too near to coinciding with the gap between
white and black, any black nationalist program is
bound to contain radical provisions about the economy. Socialism is a central feature of them. The Freedom Charter drawn up in 1955 is being adopted by an
increasing number of black political groups; it provides for the nationalization of banks, mines, and industrial monopolies, and a redivision of the land. The
charter includes also some demands that are hardly
controversial, such as freedom of speech, movement,
and association, protection from arbitrary arrest, and
equality of opportunity. But socialism is a basic feature
of all black aspirations. Those who have economic
power will not tamely surrender it.
The Cresset

If all these opposites were to be reconciled, the
necessary condition would be an effective restraint on
the power of government. What sort of restraint? A
bill of rights? A rigid constitution? Federalism? Those
who want a radical remaking of the country will find
it hard to accept any of these if it really is effective.
The bill of rights is the easiest to accept, perhaps because it is not perceived as a real obstacle to sweeping
changes. But South Africa has no experience of a bill
of rights. What is more important is a long tradition
of hostility-among the whites-to all these safeguards.
It is the whites who set the example of centralized, unrestrained power, and so weakened their claim to resist it when it passes into other hands.
The South African constitution of 1909-10 was not
rigid, but it had three clauses that could be changed
only by special majorities. One of these protected the
non-racial franchise in the Cape Province. The
Nationalist government wanted to repeal that clause in
the 1950s. Unable to get the required majority by
legitimate means, it subverted the constitution by packing the Senate and the Supreme Court. Behind this
action there was a tradition that began in the old
Transvaal republic.
The hostility to federalism began with the making of
the Union constitution in 1909. Smuts and Merriman
were the leading advocates of a centralized, unitary,
and flexible system. The glory of this got into the
schoolbooks, and apparently into the South African
blood. I had some personal experience of this. In 1948
I began to preach the advantages of a federal system
for South Africa; I did this in public lectures, articles,
and ultimately in a book. The message passed over the
heads of most of my hearers and readers; the argument seemed like a dialogue of the deaf.
Federalism had become a dirty word; or worse, an
unintelligible word. The political climate obscured it.
Today the Progressive Federal Party advocates
federalism, but does not emphasize it. One of the
more widely accepted of the many current proposals
is a federation of small units comparable to Swiss cantons, but the scheme is commonly described as "cantonal" rather than "federal" (the dirty word is
avoided). The only paper read by one of the white delegates to the Dakar conference that I have seen in
print proposes "intensive devolution of power geographically to numerous second, third, and fourth tier
governments so that power is delegated upwards instead of downwards, and lower tiers have autonomy
over purely domestic matters." Again the dirty word is
avoided, but that is not very important. The big difficulty is that restraint on the central power is an idea
that can sprout and grow only in a favorable soil and
climate. In South Africa they are not favorable, and
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we have to thank the euphoria and short-sightedness
of 1909 for that.
But in the end this may not matter much. History
is important-indispensable-for understanding all
these conflicts, but for practical purposes now what
matters is one simple fact: the gap between the
minimum that the radical blacks will accept and the
maximum that the great majority of the whites will
concede is too wide to be bridged. That is why South
Africa is a problem with no solution.
Cl

Perspective
In the old cities the sidewalks
buckle up
beneath the trees. Slow, slow
cataclysms, subtle heavings,
crack the smoothness, tilt
the trueness out
of kilter. Roots grow
there: down where
they are once were but
threads too small to bother
when the mason slid
the trowel with such care
and craft.
I laugh to
think how all that labor
now is lost;
and how
beneath the smooth, true
planes I laid down decades past,
the tender, secret fibers,
grown to gnarled, knowing serpents, now
with patient, constant increase
push with monstrous gentle
force
the surfaces asunder.
Let me
wonder less why
solid, smooth, and true
things that I counted on
are cracked, askew, and bent;
and see more worth
in unplanned angles
where I walk.

Gerald Gibson
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Robert W . Jenson

ON THE RENEWING OF THE MIND
Reflections on the Calling of Christian Intellectuals

During the time set aside to compose this essay, I
confirmed Allan Bloom's suspicions about my intellect
by following the crowd and reading his book. Especially the middle section is a much better book than I
expected .
The Closing of the American M ind is a meditation on
the state of American intellect, over against two landmark and remarkably paired diagnoses of Western history . The one is Nietzsche's: that the outcome of
philosophy, of the West's multi-millennia! effort to be
reasonable at all costs, is the discovery that there is no
reason to be reasonable-and indeed that there is no
reason to be anything else that we are not already. If
history is not to halt in bourgeois self-satisfaction, we
will therefore have to tap irrational passion and arbitrary decision precisely to move us to reason . The
other is de Tocqueville's suspicion that the regime
founded on reason , the democratic republic, must
prove inhospitable to the actual exercise of the reason
on which it is founded .
Prof. Bloom judges that de Tocqueville's fears have
been fulfilled . The nation built on Enlightenment has
not merely become ignorant and unthinking, or even
anti-intellectual in Richard Hofstadter's sense, but is
becoming incapable of thought. I have to say I agree,
and that such diagnoses do not seem to me prejudiced
by sentiment for good old days. Bloom argues also
that Nietzschean profundity, imported into the Lock-
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ean nation, has with appalling irony come to provide
the justifying ideology of our superficiality. The derivations he traces in this connection have been much
controverted among the symposiasts and reviewers,
but I cannot turn aside to that discussion.

Allan Bloom judges that Alexis
de T ocqueville's fears have been
fulfilled. The nation built on
Enlightenment has not merely become
ignorant and unthinking, but is
becoming incapable of thought.
Now-if de Tocqueville is as right as Bloom thinks,
that would seem to be an historical confirmation of
Nietzsche's position. Vice versa, if Nietzsche is right,
then de Tocqueville's prediction was not a warning but
a prophecy. And both of these are, I think, what
Bloom in fact believes-which would seem to leave
Nietzsche as the only true guide. Yet what may come
of acting on Nietzsche's kerygma has already been
tested in Europe, and none of us will favor further experiments on those lines. In this interesting situation,
Bloom can suggest only a last-ditch defense of the liberal regime, for however long this proves possible.
Huddling around the embers is his image.
The place of defense or huddling is to be, despite
everything, the "university," a term which he so uses
as to encompass many institutions not officially so denominated; indeed, it is first of all the colleges of liberal arts, in or out of "universities," which he has in
mind. The university must again become the place
where reason can be advocated against the hostility of
reason's regime. It must be the haven, for the sake of
democracy, of dissatisfaction with democracy, the place
where all those questions are asked that democratic
folk need to hear but that are natural only to aristocratic and monarchic regimes. It must administer
The Cresset

Nietzsche straight, to awake us from the sleep induced
by Nietzsche diluted.
It may reasonably (!) be doubted that academia can
perform the Munchhausen trick which Bloom proposes for it. How exactly are we to persuade a society
as hostile to reason as Bloom says ours is to license a
privileged class whose sole function is to be rational?
And how are the deep thinkers to be studied seriously
when it is known that they are being used as calculated
medicines for the health of the regime they abominate?
It is the insight of the whole line from Rousseau to
Nietzsche that reason undoes itself because it undoes
God, without whom reason-as every other interesting
virtue-is groundless. And Bloom hammers this point
home. But with respect to it he has no proposal. The
university is to be democracy's temple, but it is to
house no God. The Closing of the Ame-rican Mind ends
very much as did another recently influential book,
Alisdair Macintyre's After Virtue. Macintyre ended by
saying that what our civilization must have to survive
is something like the Benedictine order. Many who
read th is wondered how there could be Benedictines
without St. Benedict, or a saint without God. Macintyre appears to have read his own book and wondered
the same things, whereupon he reconverted to the
faith .
II

There is one part of Bloom's book where the scholarship is demonstrably slipshod : his account of the
university's origin. Most certainly, even the "modern"
university was not created from nothing by the decision of Enlighteners to extend Aristotle's educational
program to the many, in the unlikely case that there
ever was such a decision. Bloom seems to have
stopped reading with Aristotle, not to have started
again until Machiavelli, and to have hypothesized what
happened between from thin air.
The Enlightenment may have conceived the university as the place of "reason." But in its medieval origins and in some strands of its self-understanding to
this day, the university is not a universitas rationis, a
world of reason, but a world of letters, a universitas litterarum, the gathering into one place and one discourse of all those arts whose substance is books and argument. In the university's founding period, instruction
was thus accomplished by the minute examination of
texts and by the institution of debates; and anyone
who has examined the record of one of those debates
or read a medieval commentary on Aristotle will not
suppose that this method was in any way inferior to
the methods inaugurated in the eighteenth and
February, 1988

nineteenth centuries as to openness, dedication to
logic, or pedagogical impact. The university may properly and faithfully be conceived, alternatively to
liberalism's conception, as the place of discourse, of
the word.
Reason as the Enlightenment understood it is a sheer
capacity and as such an individual endowment. The
Enlightenment proposed to establish a regime by harnessing the elemental passions to reason, by turning
them into rights; also passions and rights are private
possessions. Thus if reason and rights are our foundation, we are bound to individualism; then our choice
is indeed between clinging to Locke and capitulating
to Nietzsche.

It is the insight of the whole line
from Rousseau to Nietzsche that
reason undoes itself because it undoes
God, without whom reason-as all other
interesting virtues-is groundless.
Bloom hammers the point home, but
with respect to it he has no proposal.
And in that case, bowdlerized Nietzsche will surely
win in the end, nor is it easy to see how a university
founded on reason and rights can do anything but
exacerbate the problem. Foundationally, however , the
university was not the place of reason but the place of
discourse; and the word is no one's private endowment.
It is the ontological status of community and of the
word in which community is constituted that was forgotten by the Enlightenment-and has not been remembered by Prof. Bloom.
For some generations, topics such as that of this
conference have been discussed on the assumption
that we know what an "intellectual"-or "the liberal
arts" or "the university" or whatever-are and have
only to consider how Christians can be called to this
field. I have begun with Bloom in order to summon
witness for the bankruptcy of this assumption. I doubt
that the traditional way of putting the question was
ever appropriate; it is anyway now antique. If there
ever was a separately definable "intellectual" office or
community or fate out there, to which believers might
be called, there is none now. If we have a calling, it is
not to join a predefined intellectual enterprise, but to
re-invent one. And there is nothing preposterous
about the notion, since we invented the West's intellectual enterprise in the first place. For of course, that
the word has ontological status-so that the arts of the
11

word might together make a universe-is an insight
from the Bible.

III
Mediterranean antiquity's specific ideal of knowledge would never by itself have made the university.
The organ of truth, in the classic tradition, is the
"mind's eye"; knowledge is theoria, seeing. Every selfinterpretation of the knowing subject takes one of the
senses as its metaphor; Western antiquity's metaphor
was sight. And the thing about sight is, it objectifies
the other.
It is a point I have found illuminating in many contexts: we have flaps on our eyes and none on our ears,
and we can easily aim our eyes and only with great
difficulty aim our ears. Which is to say: I control what
I see but can always be surprised by what I hear. It
is with the eye that I fix the other in space and time,
that I nail down what you/it are/is, so as to be able to
get back to you/it. It is, oppositely, by the ear that you
grab me, also when I am trying to overlook (!) you. An
ideal of knowledge which takes sight for its metaphor
makes the other the object of knowledge but does not
solicit reciprocity, does not offer the knowing subject
to be the object of the other.
That is, to knowledge for which sight is the
metaphor, the response or solicitation of the other is
not constitutive. In the final versions of Greek reflection, which became the theology of all late antiquity's
cults, this ideal of knowledge is paradigmatically and
foundationally instantiated, in Aristotle's Unmoved
Mover under various aliases. This God is a sheer act
of vision , wholly agent and not at all sufferer, receiving and expecting nothing from what is seen-if, indeed, it is acknowledged that anything other than itself comes within its purview. The Philosopher-King,
re-entering the cave for the good of its inhabitants,
asks them no questions.
There was originally a countervailing factor: the actual practice of philosophy. Whether Parmenides or
Heraclitus indulged in other discourse than the description of what they had seen we do not know, but
for the sophists and Socrates and Plato, who were not
coming from vision but trying to be on their way to it,
conversation was the daily work. It was the Socratic
conviction that the way to vision is by question and answer, and that real questions have to be actually asked,
which rescued Greek theoria from the inhumanity
which was always its temptation.
Thus it was philosophy, as practice, in which the
gospel, when it appeared on the scene of antiquity,
found both a rival and an ally. The gospel is a message and its reflection therefore an argument; the first
12

Christian theologians were simply journeymen
philosophers who had found new matter. The difference between Christian theology and pagan antiquity's
theology is that the latter, for all that it consists in talk,
leads to silence, is the handmaiden of cognition as pure
seeing, while Christianity's talk leads precisely to more
talk, to the purification and enlivening of a message.
And also the gospel's ideal of knowledge is instantiated, in the God who is his own Word.

The difference between Christian
theology and pagan antiquity's
theology is that the latter, for all
that it consists in talk, leads to
silence, is the handmaiden of
cognition as pure seeing, while
Christianity's talk leads to more talk.
Pagan antiquity had many and very talkative circles
of seekers. But what they sought was silence. A "university," per contra, is a universitas litterarum, an independent world founded on and for discourse, a world
in which discourse is its own justification, which some
enter never to leave and which initiates also those who
are to leave into precisely the talkative callings. The
university was founded by believers, to have a place in
which to exegete their Book and argue interpretations
of their message. Just so, no book and no argument
could be foreign to it. In particular, the practice of ancient philosophy and the books that documented it
were simply adopted, now in service of speech rather
than of silence.
When the Enlightenment revolted against theology
in the name of reason, it thus revolted also against
philosophy as anciently practiced, since it was theology
by which that practice was now carried on. Thus in the
Enlightenment's understanding and practice of
"reason," the countervailing factor is gone. Reason becomes what even Aristotle did not make it: sheerly the
individual's ability to see truth. And for that, the university is, when push comes to shove, not really
needed at all. It is that last point which Prof. Bloom's
book-to make one last reference to it-finally lays before us , willy-nilly.
IV

Christians' calling to intellect is the calling to nurture the word, to tend books and foster argument.
This was always the case, but in our present cirThe Cresset

cumstances we must be unwontedly clear about it. We
serve a talkative God, who does not even seem to be
able to do without a library. In his service, we will be
concerned for talk and libraries. And some of us will
have the privilege of spending a lot of time at that
concern; if anyone wishes to call these "Christian intellectuals," there is no great reason to interdict the label.
The model and origin of our care of books is the
church's care of that library, the Bible. I understand
that this is backward to the usual conceptions, but the
usual conceptions, if they were ever appropriate, are
anyway now mere anachronisms. So I will reverse the
usual conception, and inquire first what the church
does with the Bible and second what the university
might therefore do with its books.
The church, first, reads the Bible liturgically. The
writings that are canon for the church and that together we call the Bible are recited in the gathered
community, to shape its imagination, suggest its argumentative warrants, cast its moral vision. The university, the community of Western intellect, also has a
canon of writings. It is not quite so clearly marked as
the canon of Scripture-though the contrast must not
be overplayed, since also the canon of Scripture is intrinsically open-but it will serve; at least its center is
indicable. In a living university , the sheer shared experience-never mind interpretation or understanding!--of
such as Plato and Augustine and Newton would be the
foundation of everything else. That experience is now
indeed embers, but the embers need blowers, not
huddlers. Christians are the only ones around who
have clear and arguable and imperative reason to blow
on them.
Second, the church researches the Bible, it labors on
its book with the kind of reading which is misleadingly
called "historical-critical method" as if with old texts
there were some other. We persistently ask: What did
the author say? What really happened? These are lifeand-death questions for the believer. The first need
not commit the famous "intentional fallacy"; we cannot
ask what the author intended to say, but we must ask
what s/he in fact got-past tense!-said. Neither is the
second question hopeless of answer nor does it lead us
necessarily into historical relativism, though there is no
opportunity here to retrace theology's long and in my
judgment hopeful struggle with "hermeneutics."
Christianity did not invent such reading, but only
for Christianity does salvation ride on it. Thus the
techniques which we all assume and which created the
nineteenth-century German university, still more or
less our model, were all invented to deal with the
Bible-if in many cases only to get clear of it. In a living university, a certain historicism would always infuse the vanous undertakings; not even natural sciFebruary, 1988

ence would regard its own history and great texts as
beside its enterprise. A world which forgot historicalcritical reading would be one in which the church
could not live; our calling here is imperative.
Finally, the church looks to the Bible for paradigms
of its reflection, of "theology." The church is to preach
the gospel, and all its thinking is about what to say to
be doing that. But "the gospel" is simply a label for
what the apostles said. So while the apostles' theology,
that is the thinking they did to form their message,
may not have been and for the most part was not very
good theology, we can at least be sure it was theology.
The theological authority of Scripture is fundamentally methodological: we look to it to see what the reflective labor was like that we are now to undertake.
When the university has been healthy, it has looked
to its books in much the same way. In the high

Boar
By moonlight they come, rat grey or dusky blue,
one candle power purer than shadow. Impossible
how they move all that bulk
without twig-snap or crunch of leaves, and the
old cartoon about pigs as ballerinas
is no joke now
as they sweep the orchard for fruit. They step
silently, or stand stock-stili, until
you see stars through them
or a further field littered with boulders, or
the boles of trees, pear or cherry or
apple, or you see
nothing at all. The gift they leave you with is
night, writhingly alive in apparitions
and a thrill of imminent peril
-that, had you stood in their way, or stumbled
upon one of their young by mistake,
tusks would have instantly
encompassed all that the world
will ever hold for you, and the godawful weight.

Frank Polite
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medieval period, reverence for Aristotle did not mean
unwillingness to disagree with him; it meant that he
was the master of analysis, to whom those who sought
to analyze should be apprenticed. In the eighteenth
century, the authority of Newton and Locke did not
mean there was no more to be discovered; it meant
precisely that if one did as they did one might discover
as much as or more than they did. The fundamental
collapse of the university in our time is that it does not
know what specifically it is to do, and it does not know
what it is to do because the triumph of Enlightenment
reason deprives the university of its drillmasters, including the Enlighteners. Here, too, Christians may
have a word of quite specific comfort: do not be afraid
to look to Western intellect's masters and see what
they did.
So much-in this lecture-for the Book and books.
Discourse does not consist in books, it consists in argument using books. Christians' calling to nurture argument can be very bluntly and so quickly stated. Since
the message we have for the world contradicts everything the world could possibly suppose, argument is
guaranteed whenever we show up--unless we have
forgotten ourselves. It is not Nietzsche who will effectively challenge our current discoursive sloth, or
rather, it is Nietzsche precisely in that the challenge he
made was a version-an unbelieving and despairing,
but nonetheless faithful version--of the Christian challenge. Proclamation of the meaninglessness of the
world will not now startle anyone-if it really ever did ;
the claim that a first-century Palestinian is the meaning of things is another matter.
I do not mean that direct proclamation of the gospel
is our calling to the intellect-though a bit more of
that could hardly hurt. But those involved in the gospel's general argument with the world will necessarily
fall afoul also of whatever are the self-evidencies of
their special "disciplines." I have arrived at my next
and last main matter.

v
The title of this essay is "The Renewing of the
Mind." The title is intended in a double sense. In the
one sense, it refers to our calling to re-establish the intellectual enterprise, as I have just been discussing that
calling. The other sense depends more directly on the
passage from Paul's letter to Rome from which my
title is a citation. "Do not be conformed to this world
but be transformed by the renewal of your minds." (Romans 12:2) The passage's location is significant: Romans 12: 1-3 is Paul's capsule description of Christian
existence, a thesis set at the beginning of the whole
parenetic section of his most reflective writing.
14

The word translated "mind" is that same big word
of antique reflection, "nous." A survey of its appearances in Paul's writings quickly makes his use apparent. Paul's "nous" is not theoria; rather, it is much the
same as Kant's ''judgment" or Jonathan Edwards'
"sense of the heart." "Nous" is moral choice that is not
mere-i.e. arbitrary--choice but is precisely as moral
choice the discernment of what is really out there. To
use Edwards' favorite example, borrowed by him from
a long tradition: if I "like" honey, that is my choice,
and yet my taste for honey registers reality, for honey
does in fact taste good.

It is characteristic of the modern
West to suppose that knowledge of
facts and choice of goods are two
separate acts, so that knowledge is
morally irrelevant and choice of the
good arbitrary. I once regarded
this as a dogma beyond challenge.
It is characteristic of the modern West to suppose
that knowledge of facts and choice of goods are two
separate acts, so that knowledge is morally irrelevant
and choice of the good arbitrary; when I first began
to teach philosophy, I regarded this as a dogma
beyond challenge. But of course the whole previous
tradition supposed that the two must be somehow
united, that somewhere in the structure of personhood
there must be a grasp on reality that is inseparably
knowledge of fact and choice of good, that is precisely
taste for what is good. Such was Paul's "nous."
But if there is such a thing as judgment, it must
guide all intellectual activity, since it is their unity. Vice
versa, the dogma that there cannot be any such thing
as judgment is the foundation dogma of the intellectual tradition that is dying around us. Christians' calling to renew argument is a guaranteed success if only
we are faithful. For we must invariably dissent from
the founding dogma of the-barely-existing intellectual world.
Paul's summary of the Christian life is that it consists
in the "renewing" (anakainosis) of judgment. Paul does
not ask how judgment is possible in the first place, not
being much of a philosopher. But what he thinks does
appear. The transformed judgment has as its object "to
agathon kai euareston kai teleion," which are epexegetical
upon "the will of God." And indeed and of course, the
reality of God is the necessary condition of an act of
mind which as choice of the good is also knowledge of
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the fact. That I choose "such-and-such is good" is in
itself a fact only about me; that the Creator chooses so
is a fact about the facts. Within an intellectual enterprise that either denies God or relegates him to the
fringes, judgment is indeed not possible.
Christians' calling to renew judgment-and just so,
under the circumstances, to renew argument-will require us to speak of God, right out loud. In our time,
we are called to renew the "apologetic" enterprise, not
so much to enable converts as to tell why judgment is
after all possible, since there is God.
Continuing with exegesis of Paul: renewal of mind
takes place as a transformation, of which only the terminus a quo is explicitly named in our text. We are to
wean our judgment, our taste, from conformity to
"this world" (tw aioni toutw). Paul does not need to
name the terminus ad quem; it is the Kingdom of God,
the "world to come." A "world," an aion, is a temporal
whole, not so much one big thing as one big historyone narrative, to use the currently fashionable word.
Each temporal whole has a schema, a pattern of how
things go in it, the lines of which our judgment can
bend to, or not. Since an aion is a temporal whole, its
schema is determined by what it seeks. In Paul's understanding, what this aion seeks is hate, the perfected
encapsulation of each thing in what it already is. But
there is to be a miracle; what will in fact come of this
age is a new one. And what that age will seek is love,
the perfected opening of each thing to the future the
other is for it.
We do not live in the coming age. But we can already, since in the resurrection we see what the
scheme of that age will be, bend our judgment to its
temporal contours. At least Paul says we can, and that
this bending is the whole substance of Christian life.
Besides supposing that judgment is possible and that
it is the mind's controlling unity, Christians suppose
that we rightly judge when we judge each item and
sector of reality by how it opens to the love that is to
come of it.
Only when-believers will say-we consider how, for
example, the polity will finally undergo revolution into
mutuality can we claim to know it. Alisdair Macintyre
has pointed out the peculiarity that the social sciences
have found no "laws" in the proper sense at all, yet
are not discredited thereby. He suggests that there can
be only one explanation: the predictions made by
these disciplines are not of that sort at all, they are not
of the sort that can be falsified by one contrary event.
Of what sort are they then? Readers of the Bible can
hardly refrain from suggesting: perhaps they are
prophecies, to be verified or falsified conclusively only
by the character of the Kingdom when it comes. A renewal of argument, where such opinions turn up,
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would seem assured.
For another and historical example, Jonathan Edwards, a far more careful reader of Newton than all
his contemporary vulgar Enlighteners put together,
proposed that the physical world is the intersubjectivity of universal personal communion between God and
created persons and between the latter, that the physical world is what God thinks in order to think a community that can include others than himself. Edwards
argued that such an interpretation sticks closer to the
actual features of Newtonian science than does interpretation by the metaphor of machinery, which was
dominant around him. Moreover, if that is so, then
what it is to be physical is malleable to transformations
of relations in the universal community. The saints,
Edwards once speculated, "will be able to see from one
side of the universe to the other" since they will not
see "by such slow rays of light that are several years
travelling ... " (Miscellanies, 926)
Perhaps such thoughts may not seem quite so
ridiculous as they once did; the boundary between science and its philosophical self-interpretation is not
nearly so plainly marked as formerly. Why should such
speculation be barred from physics classrooms? And
how do we know that the movement of science itself
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must be immune to them?
Or again, whatever are the "humanities"? Somehow,
they are the disciplines that study humanity, yet are
not social sciences. But what can that distinction mean?
In practice, the humanities seem to comprise the several activities of interpretation of the arts, plus about
half of what historians do. Perhaps this is not so onsensible a grouping, and perhaps those made contrary
by the gospel may have something to say to it.
Western reflection has traditionally-prior to
romanticism, which opens other questions-traced the
fissure in human life as running between the true and
the good, what is and what ought to be, and has
looked to the beautiful as the possible reconciliation.
The arts are thus interpreted as judgment in actionwe may think of Kant's interpretation of the beautiful
as serendipitous good or of Aquinas' interpretation of
it as truth's attraction. If now the good is eschatological, if the good is the aion to come, the arts are the
presence of the future, the enacted "groaning" and
"longing" of creation for what it is not but will be.
Christian interpreters might tell of the arts in such
terms; and such telling and the telling of history
would not go ill together. On such a basis, there might
even be reason to practice and teach the humanities.
VI

I could continue with examples-or anyway, someone could. But there is instead one final point that
must be made. The Christian calling to the intellect,
whether because of its nature or because of our present situation, is not an individual calling. It is communities that can be dedicated to discourse, and to the
renovation of judgment. And a dedicated community
is an institutionalized one: it is institutions, like those
here represented, that might undertake to re-invent
the West's intellectual enterprise.
It is the enterprise as such that needs to be reinvented, the total discourse of the university that we
are called to renew. Readers will divine that I conclude
with the traditional insistence on what is usually and
disastrously named "interdisciplinary" discourse, and
with the not quite so traditional insistence on its institutionalization. But perhaps there is one difference
between my insistence and that which we have so often
heard, which may even make mine a bit more plausible.
The failure of good resolutions to get the disciplines
together is easily explained: for the most part, they are
given nothing to do together except to be together, or
they are given some momentous "topic" artificially invented for the purpose. But Christians are now called
to nothing less than the re-institution of that common
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discourse within which and only within which our several "disciplines" can exist at all-at least, as human
undertakings. We have decidedly urgent "interdisciplinary topics": restoration of the liturgical, scholarly,
and paradigmatic experience of the books by which
the university lives, and the institution of a universitysaving argument between the prejudices of modernity
and the truth of the gospel.
Cl

The Hiroshima Baby
That Saturday the humidity bloomed
Early. When my father finished the last
Sweet roll, the dawn birds were already gone.
What he heard was the bakery filled with
The end of the Armco shift. What he knew
Was my mother was waiting, afraid to
Subtract one hour from ~is wage-time. He stepped
Into the last decent hour of August,
And they listened to none of the day's chant
About the city turned into a cloud.
They lived in smoke; the mill was overhead,
Hologram of need . Though there is nothing
Of my birth in any of the papers
My mother saved except tHe local one.
It features the last Etna serviceman
Killed in action; it leaves Hiroshima
Out, and I think that sailor probably
Thought he had made it, that I came as close
to the post-war boom as the doctor dared;
Overdue, long and silent and frightening
My parents into doubting his judgment.

So quiet-I might have been listening
For an explanation, Japan's tremor
Brushing each unused nerve. I might have been
Waiting for the list
Of the dead who were
Related to me.

Gary Fincke

The Cresset

Tod M. Trimble

MUSIC AND THE TIME OF OUR LIVES
Langer, Chomsky, Bernstein, and Jung

I was once challenged by Dr. Mary Kime, professor
of music and dean of the graduate college at the University of Denver, to consider the following: if an extraterrestrial being landed and asked me (as a musician) what I do here, why I do it, and how it fits in
with the rest of humanity, what (on earth!) would be
my response? One may believe either that Dr. Kime
should be burned at the stake for inflicting mental anguish upon her academic fold, or, conversely, that any
supposed teacher of music who does not periodically
raise some form of her question should be flogged.
Whether she is asking the impossible or the issue
should have been resolved generations ago, the questions remain, glistening and grinning. What is aesthetic experience? What is art? Are they the same?
Why does art exist? Why do some people respond?
Why doesn't everyone respond? What is aesthetic response?-which completes the seemingly impenetrable
circle back to "What is aesthetic experience?" These
questions surround an imperturbable Art like Conestoga wagons in the Old West. The millenia have
brought hundreds of war-painted philosophers and
artists to the camp to whoop and holler and circle and
circle and circle. And still the secret is kept.
Modern thought has made even this comparison
seem grossly inept, for many who claim to be responsive to art insist that it is not over there at all, but here
within the individual. It would seem that an externalized Beauty dis-covered by the artist has been replaced by the artist as the center of attention, the artist
as revealer of the inner life. It is three such lines of
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thought that will be examined here. I begin with the
work of Susanne K. Langer, whose ideas are best developed and most applicable to music. From Langer I
proceed to Leonard Bernstein's interpolations of
Noam Chomsky's work in linguistics, which make
more sense in light of Langer, and end with Carl
Jung, whose theory (re-)introduces into the discussion
somewhat older notions of the external world.
Of the three theoreticians, Susanne K. Langer is unquestionably the most intellectually challenging to
grasp. Hers is the most comprehensive theory and the
best developed . My interpretations of her ideas are
drawn from two of her books, Philosophy in a New Key
(Cambridge, Mass., 1942) and Feeling and Form: A
Theory of Art Developed from "Philosophy in a New Key"
(New York, 1953). There exists the centuries-old idea
of Beauty being an externalized perfection of form, a
separate and invisible entity in this profane world
which the artist attempts to uncover. Langer, however,
joins the stream of humanistic philosophy which not
only posits man as the measure of all things but declares that Beauty exists only within man. A thing of
beauty is a thing of beauty if and only if man perceives it as beautiful. There is no beauty apart from
man's perception. (If a tree grew in the forest with
perfect health and form and no one was there to see
it .. .) This has led to the notion that art is a representation of the artist's emotional experience of perceivmg.
Here Langer parts company with the pack. Her position is that art is not the artist's projection of the
outer sensuous life (Beauty) nor a direct representation of his delight in perceiving beauty. Art does not
have semantic or literal symbolic meaning based on
the perception of the outside world, nor is it a literal
emotional re-enactment of the world within. As language is a manifestation of the logical thought which
organizes the outer world, art is the manifestation of
the logical process which organizes the life of feeling.
This logic of emotion is an extraordinary notion m
light of our modern views of the human psyche.
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Langer posits two modes of organization with which
the mind processes the complexities of existence. The
first is discursive logic, known to us in its end-product
of language. It moves in a linear fashion, one step
(tho ught) at a time. Discursive logic has developed its
own rational powers to the point at which, by its own
standards, human emotion is a slough of incomprehensible inconsistencies, obviously a vestigial reminder of our alleged history of apes. In fact, says
Langer, emotion is organized by what she calls presentational thinking, which functions perfectly logically in
whole blocks of (emotional) information. It corresponds roughly to the ideas of Gestalt psychology, and
its lack of linear logic is what makes it so incomprehensible to rationalism and so unamenable to language.

Susanne Langer posits two modes of
organization with which the mind
processes the complexities of
existence. The first is discursive
logic, known to us in its end-product
of language. It moves in a linear
fashion, one step (thought) at a time.
As language is the end-product of the organization
of linear logic (and yet participates in its further development), so art is the end-product of sentient logic
(and yet participates in its further development). The
crucial distinction to be made is this: Art is not feeling
nor does it symbolize nor represent specific feelings.
Unlike language, it does not denote. Art represents
the course of feel ings, the path they follow, how one
(unidentified) feeling can meld into another.
Art for Langer is perceived as an analog to the life
of feeli ng. Th is explains how two people can share an
emotive response to a work and yet be perplexed at
their d ifference in interpretation. For each, the movement of fee ling has been sensed, and this is primary.
Secondarily, the sensation of sentient movement has
probably evoked the different associations in the two
beho lders. If I may be allowed a poor analogy (which
the more d isciplined Langer avoids), the successfu l artist constructs a watercourse and the receptive beholder
senses and identifies with the flow . If you suddenly
fo und you rself blindfolded in a swiftly moving raft,
you might not be able to tell immediately whether you
were in the Grand Canyon's Colorado River, in the
midd le of the Mississippi, or surging through the Atlantic in the Gu lf Stream, but you wou ld have a strong
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sense of movement nonetheless.
Each work of art offers a "virtual image," its presentation to the beholder's perceptions. The virtual image
is completely dependent upon, yet supersedes
technique. The better the technique, the more completely is it swallowed up in the power of this virtual
image. One sees David-matter meeting space-not
chisel gougings in stone. We do not watch the dancer
relax the muscles in her lower back and fold over. We
witness the swan's death, the power of death over the
power of life. Each artistic genre produces its own
class of virtual images, which evoke aesthetic response
corresponding to a specific aspect of human experience.
Langer carefully develops the individual experiential
frame of reference for most of the plastic and literary
forms. Painting corresponds to the emotional conception of a "scene." Sculpture represents the presentational conceptualization of volume and its interfacing
with space. Drama conceptualizes our feelingfu l experience of Destiny, whether in the form of Fate
(tragedy) or Fortune (comedy). "The primary illusion
of music," she says in Feeling and Form, "is the sonorous image of passage [time as transience], abstracted
from actuality to become free and plastic and entirely
perceptible."
Perhaps if I were better versed in the other art
forms , I wouldn't feel her success was so uneven, but
I do believe that Langer makes better correspondence
between technique and result for the literary and plastic forms than she does for music. Chapter-by-chapter,
with her success in developing each of the other arts
in relation to its presentational logic, I all the more anticipated a similar exposition of music, but it unfortunately never came. Leonard Bernstein's theory will
later give a clue as to why this may be so.
By the end of Feeling and Form, Langer has lapsed
into a metaphysical perspective which she has consciously struggled to avoid. Her vocabulary has become absolutely religious, especially in her reporting
of how we "offer ourselves up" to art. I take this not
as a fai lure of logic on her part, but as an instance of
the apparent inability of the human being to be completely self-satisfied or even totally nurtured by other
humans. (This is one of the broken promises and false
hopes of humanism, but no more of that here.)
Langer's work is so insightful and so revealing that
one can only be grateful for her perspective-changing
contribution . But I do sense a gap, not in her logic but
in her system, between the technique and craft of
music, its "parts," and the fin ished work-the sonorous objectification of the subjective experience of the
passage of time. Bernstein's model doesn't begin to fi ll
in this gap, but may help explain why Langer has been
The Cresset

able to bridge it for other arts but not for music.
In The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard
(Cambridge, Mass., 1976), Bernstein follows the same
star as Langer, looking in language for a model of
music. He seizes upon a linguistic model of Noam
Chomsky called "transformational grammar." According to Chomsky, normal theories of language, which
might be typified by the diagramming of sentences, do
not account for the transformation of a positive statement into its corresponding negative , or its interrogative, or a change in tense . Simply stated Chomsky
poses a "deep structure" in which every thinkable notion exists in its positive, present-tense, and active
form. The transformational grammar is responsible,
by means of deletion , interposition, condensation, and
other techniques, for aligning the various strings of
meaning into clauses with a correct syntactical relation
to one another, and for producing the (hopefully)
most appropriate version from among the almost
countless variations that any given subject-action-object
conception can generate. What is uttered Chomsky
calls the "surface structure."

In The Unanswered Question: Six
Talks at Harvard, leonard Bernstein
follows the same star as Langer,
looking in language for a model of
music. He seizes upon a linguistic
model of Noam Chomsky called
"transformational grammar."
Bernstein proposes that a similar process of transformation may be extrapolated from Chomsky to explain the relationship between ordinary discourse and
literary art. As the deep structure is to the surface
structure, so is the surface structure to artistic utterance. Note that many of the transformational grammar processes (deletion, interposition, and so forth)
have been identified previously as rhetorical methods.
This in no way detracts from Bernstein's suggestions.
It may rather point to a consistency among mental
processes. The science of rhetoric may be a conscious
and deliberate portion of procedures normally carried
out instantaneously and subconsciously by transformational grammar. That is not to suggest that rhetoric is
a method of, or produces art. Rather, it may serve as
a partial model of artistic process.
Beneath the deep structure of language there lie the
lowest common denominators of linguistic analysis,
which are phonemes (sounds) and morphemes (smalFebruary, 1988

lest units of meaning-one level up from phonemes [I,
anti- , carry, etc.]). Bernstein proposes that the musical
analogs to these phonemes are musical sounds, or individual notes. He claims the origin of the particular
notes in Western music is in the overtone series and
relates this rather convincingly to the history of consonance in Western European music. It would seem that
the order in which intervals were accepted as consonant is roughly the order of intervals produced by
each succeeding overtone relative to the fundamental.
The first accepted consonance was presumably the octave, then the fifth, and so on.
Now there are, of course, problems with this, as with
anything. Whether or not the octave is innately sensed
as unity or as one, or whether this is a learned perception has yet to be established. Until it is, the "naturalness" of the diatonic scale based on the harmonic
series can only be speculation. Bernstein moves on.
Though he never makes it clear, I presume that
Bernstein's musical deep structure includes scalar
progressions, modal sequences, conceptions of harmonic tension, and other "stock" musical entities which
might be thought of as being the smallest units of musical meaning. I'm not sure whether this corresponds
more exactly to the linguistic deep structure per se
(complete ideas amenable to transformation) or to the
levels beneath (phonemes and morphemes). The
reason this must remain unclear will be discussed presently. For now it doesn't matter because the strength
of Bernstein's assertion rests on the extraordinary relationship of this incompletely defined musical deep
structure to the level of musical art.
Remember that in language, Bernstein develops a
progression in which Chomsky's deep structure is to
the surface structure as the surface structure is to literary art. The difference between this model and
music's model, Bernstein contends, is that with music
there is no intervening level between the deep structure and art. Musical art makes a quantum leap, as it
were, from its deep structure, without an intervening
surface structure as in language.
Bernstein's
~literary ART musical ~
Bernstein's extrapolation from Chomsky
(

Chomsky's
linguistic SURFACE STRUCTURE

/
Chomsky's transformational grammar
{
Chomsky's
linguistic DEEP STRUCTURE

\
Bernstein's
extrapolation
from Chomsky

J

Bernstein's
DEEP STRUCTURE musical

Now here is an insight which is most promising in
terms of explaining music's continuing resistance to
explanation in general, and Susanne Langer's greater
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success in relating the material to the response in the
literary and plastic forms than in music. In language,
it is the surface structure that serves as a key to determining the make-up of the supposed deep structure.
It is the semantic, or meaning, of a given surface
structure statement and consideration of all this statement's possible permutations (negative, interrogative,
active/passive, etc.) that allow Chomsky to deduce the
semantic or meaning of the deep structure. The elements of surface structure have semantic identities
that allow us to infer the make-up of the linguistic
deep structure. Without a surface structure in music,
we really have no workable semantic to deduce the
smallest units of musical meaning, or music's deep
structure. So we cannot begin to relate music's elements to the end-product because we don't know
exactly what the "elements" are nor what the deep
structure is.
It can be supposed that the deep structure is the
level at which a music exists in its untransformed state,
subject to the subsequent modifications (a musical
transformational grammar) that can transform it into
art. But we haven't the vaguest idea of the elemental
form . Without a mid-point to examine (surface structure), how can we deduce the smallest organization of
meaning? Is it a note? A phrase? A harmonic interval?
A melodic interval? A chord? A scale? A rhythm? A
tone-row?
Bernstein has some fine ideas about the endproduct. I appreciate the clarity with which he demonstrates denied expectation and can only agree that repetition and the role of memory must play a more significant role than they are usually accorded. But his
discussion about the make-up of the elemental units of
music is as fuzzy as Langer's is absent, though I believe his own theory may tell us why.
Let us look briefly at meaning, because the reader
well-versed in Langer may be protesting that Langer
devotes perhaps half of her work to argument against
a literal meaning in art. She carefully works out a distinction between signaling/denoting and symbolizing,
so that she can make herself clear that art does not
symbolize things; art does not function by delivering
literal semantic meaning. It does not represent things
or even feelings; rather it symbolizes the inner movement or life of feeling. If symbols do not function
primarily to carry meaning in literary art (Bernstein's
upper level) , does it matter whether or not we have a
musical surface structure to illuminate the meaning of
the elemental units in the deep structure?
The matter can also be considered as follows: If we
bring Langer's and Chomsky's/Bernstein's models sideby-side, we have, in literature, a surface structure rich
in specific meaning, from which we can deduce the
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smallest units of meaning operating unconsciously in
the deep structure. But according to Langer, the art
at Bernstein's highest level does not succeed because it
conveys these literal meanings. If literal meanings
don't function in art, does it matter that we don't
know what the literal meanings are of units of music?
I think it does. I think Langer sees her primary goal
as explaining the separation of literal meaning from
artistic process, and rightly so. The idea of art expressing literal meaning is so much a part of our thinking
that it does take her two volumes to make a strong
case. However, that is not to say that the literal meanings of the individual elements of a work are voided
once they are part of a piece of art. A play that uses
themes of motherhood may not be written to represent maternal feelings at all (Oedipus Rex, for example).
Yet the skillful use of the "mother" semantic provides
an analog to a certain aspect of the life of feeling
(which need not or perhaps cannot be defined [except,
perhaps as Langer's Destiny and Fate]). This analog

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway IV
(After Lao Tzu)
8.

May the root thrive is carved on my mantle.
Be rooted, then, in the sacred pathway,
Plant yourself like Godric, and standfast,
Receiving the blessedness this pathway
Wants you to feel.
Then take this blessing of rootedness
To your labors
To your temples
To your court
To your market
To your home
And all will, with you
Become rooted in virtue.
How did the pathway become so clear?
As God said to Moses, the sign that I am
With you is that you are there.

Travis DuPriest
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could not be provided in exactly the same way by any
other semantic, even though the term "mother" may have
lost its directly symbolic function in the work.
The meanings of words and recognizable visible
forms may be thought of as tools that contribute to the
work's form whether or not these symbols are apparent or even functioning in the finished product.
Granted, the idea that it is our loss that there exists no
musical intermediate usage between "feeling and
form" may be important only to the musician.
Whether or not a brick wall is constructed of "Z-brick"
paste-ups or the real thing wouldn't make much difference to the casual admirer of a decor. But it would
matter very much to a brickmason.
The rest of Bernstein's book is something of a disappointment. Rather than really developing a transformational grammar for music, he applies his knowledge
of twentieth-century music to an insightful comparison
with contemporary literature. He proposes that literature of our time works backwards through the linguistic
succession of phonemes-morphemes-syntax-semantics,
and that music does the same. Modern forms concern
themselves with sounds, not words or sentences, certainly not meaning. This is a particular convenience
for music, since the meanings have never been pinned
down anyway. But this breakdown in meaning (which
began long before our century) is not transformational
grammar but an abrogation of it, the undoing of logical process.
I agree totally with Bernstein's analysis of these developments but find it impossible to share his enthusiasm for them. I don't believe that modern art is moving us toward a mystical union of love and death, nor
that this would be in the least desirable. But if Bernstein has brought us to the portal of the metaphysical,
it's time to move on to one much better equipped to
usher us in and show us around .
Carl Jung may have had as much to say about symbols as any author of our time. Unfortunately for our
purposes, his work was almost exclusively devoted to
visual symbols. This is understandable in that his interest in symbolic information stemmed from an endeavor to interpret dream material in order to understand the life of the psyche and the subconscious. According to J ung the psyche makes sense of the world
through its own manipulation of symbols. While this is
similar to Langer in general, it differs considerably in
detail. Jung gives relatively less importance to thinking, that is to Langer's discursive logic. This is because
he believes there are four modes for processing experience, existing in complementary pairs. The primary pair is thinking and feeling. The more the person relies upon one, the less developed the other. The
second pair, analogous to the first and sometimes beFebruary, 1988

hind the scenes, is sensation and intuition. Jung develops all this into a rather elaborate personality theory
with personality types based on the fo ur-way interaction of modes. What is important here is that he does
put the four processing modes on more-or-less equal
footing. He accords each a logic of its own , though
placing far less emphasis on rational (Langer discursive) logic than do Langer and many other moderns.

I have always admired Carl Jung for
his ability to deal with religious
phenomena. So many intellectuals
who claim to explain religion feel
matter-bound (duty is passe) to
explain it away, usually saying
nothing in a very precise manner.
Logical thinking is probably less important for Jung
because all four modes give us clues to the rich "world
within," the complex life of the psyche where symbols
exist as larger entities than they do for Langer. For
Langer, symbols are the rational intellect's (and society's) creation used to organize experience. T hey are
utilitarian in a sense. It is probably fair to say that for
Jung, symbols are experience itself, strong enough to
be independent of direct experience. T hat is to say
that symbols can come to reside in the individual
psyche by way of the Collective Unconscious.
The Collective Unconscious may be understood in
one or both of two ways. In works like Modem Man in
Search of a Soul (New York, 1933), it is sort of a genetic
memory, biologically acquired, a type of intellectual instinct. I believe in his later workings, however , as in
Man and His Symbols (New York, 1964) Jung is more
willing to accord a metaphysical reality to the Collective Unconscious.
I have always admired Dr. Jung fo r his ability to
deal with religious phenomena. So many intellectuals
who claim to explain religion feel matter-bound (duty
is passe) to explain it away, usually saying absolutely
nothing in a very precise manner. T he challenge accepted by J ung (to work with religious experience on
its own terms) is far greater, of course, and per fectly
consistent with his four-way model of mental process.
If he is wi lling to admit that there are ways to process
experience apart from thin king (logic), then the existence of entities in the universe not discover able
(much less sanctioned) by logic is per fec tly plausible. If
he gives place to intuition (which most of us do informally, at least), then there is no reason to assume that
sensation and its child em piricism are always going to
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have the last word.
It is in Jung that we come back to the ancient notion
that art directly represents experience in the Great
Beyond. Jung's Great Beyond is primarily in the unconscious, though he does not rule out the possibility
that the inner life corresponds to and may even be in
contact with an outer reality beyond cognition .
It must be said that Jung's aesthetic theory is not
very developed . In the first place, it was not a life's
goal for him as it has been for Langer, nor a matter
of professional interest, as for Bernstein. Secondly, his
world view has less need of an articulated aesthetic doctrine. He would agree with Langer that art does not
imitate nor represent nature. They could probably
agree in such terms as art being the objective manifestation of psychic symbols. Here Jung can rest content
because for him psychic symbols are life and experience itself.
But Langer must continue. For all her talk about the
"life" of feeling, she struggles hard (without apology)
to keep life in the real world , the sensation-reinforced
concrete domain comfortable to rationalists. The inner
realms function as a means to the end of making sense
of the outer, tangible world. And yet in the end , as
mentioned before, she arrives at her own Great
Beyond. She stands before what can only be a deified
Art. We are to "offer ourselves up" to Art, which
alone can instruct us about our feelings. Though she
herself does not say so, she entertains, without refutation , quotations which claim that there is no real order
in nature save that which Art has taught us to see. For
the inheritor of an intellectual tradition that claims to
have long since outgrown mysticism, she can pen quite
a paean of praise to Art set high on its pedestal.
Langer and her beautifully elaborated symbolic
transformation, Bernstein borrowing Chomsky's transformational grammar, and Jung's symbols as experience itself all attempt to come to grips with aesthetic
experience. T he concepts of "symbol" and "transformation" are the common interests of the three. Symbol, meaning, the meanings of life, and transformation, the processes of living, come together in the
works of these thinkers. And emotion is the means,
end, or both .
So what wou ld I tell the extraterrestrial who is curious about earthlings and music? I would say that we
humans perceive the unfolding of our lives as an event
in itself, something quite apart from the sum of our
observable experiences. We come to know the dimension of time in our lives not as an unvarying, linear,
and constant check-list of seconds attained, but as an
utterly plastic phenomenon, sometimes menacing,
sometimes forgiving. Our adventure with time is
sensed as passage that ebbs and flows, waxes and
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wanes, crawls almost to a stop, then hurtles with aching speed. Our chronometers may succeed in dividing
time into tidy units of equal value, but our dreams and
our memories know nothing of this.
For some, this sense of unfolding becomes so intense that we look for symbols whose courses run
parallel to our own transformations or we seek out occasions to experience the symbols created by others.
Music is this sonorous objectification of the sense of
passage through time. Music is not timeless. Its smallest units of meaning remain a mystery, but whatever
they are, these aural symbols must move through time
in order to have any meaning at all. The composer
and performer coordinate several layers of dynamic
elements-the sound symbols of a particular music tradition. The listener who recognizes those symbols on
hearing is offered a powerful experience of pure time.
It is the subjectivity of our experience of time that
lends the composer and performer this power. Strikingly, they must be masters at manipulating sound in
real time in order to create the illusion of perceived
time. This is paradox. And this is music.
Cl

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway V
(After Lao Tzu )

9.
Plant the seed and never touch it again.
If it does not rain, do not water the ground .
The seed has life in itself.
If it rains too much, do not replant it.
The seed can withstand abuse.
Keep your hands off. Wait.
Watch the sprout, enjoy the tuberous green .
Glance one day at the flower,
Sit one day under the tree , lean against its bark.
Arrange the seats in the garden but no more.
Invite guests in to sit with you in the cool
Silence, to enjoy the shade of the tree
You never touched .
All will be restored .

Travis DuPriest
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Women of 1987
Gail McGrew Eifrig
It's already a little late, but it
seems a good idea to look back on
certain political events of 1987, a
year that ended with all of us reeling from the thrill of having Gary
Hart back in the presidential campaign (as if the tireless and
tirelessly
self-deceived
senator
could ever have been said to be out
of it). This event seemed nearly
perfect to round out a year in
which the way our society thinks of
women dropped to a new low.
Since it's popular to blame nearly
everything we don't like on the
Reagan administration, I guess they
can take this one too, but I don't
think there has been a year of my
lifetime in which women looked
worse.
And I'm not referring to hemlines. During the year women were
relentlessly demeaned in the media.
Not all the beings so demeaned appeared to notice, and some of them
got very rich in the course of it;
I'm thinking here of such charmers
as Jessica Hahn and Donna Rice.
Others seemed positively to bask in
the sunshine of the delighted gaze
of the American public, rapt in
glassy-eyed amazement at Fawn
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Hall doing her duty by God and
country. The elevation to favorite
candidate status of a prominent
woman-trasher like Hart is what we
could expect, I suppose, when what
we expect of women is a question
nobody has a very good answer for
anymore.
I am not so much talking here
about individual relations, or about
the view of sex roles and gender
difference that we work out personally with the people we know
and live with. I think that we have
experienced some small gains in
these areas; among people I work
with, women are expected to be
honest, hard-working teachers like
everybody else. In general, the
people I know seem to expect that
women will be about as good, or as
bad, or as trustworthy, or as badtempered, or as generous as the
rest of the human race.
But what a spectacle we watched
in the news. We may have slid into
1987 prepared for Woman as Dope
by the kind of coverage given to
Imelda Marcos. Interesting that
though she apparently is a woman
of a considerably nasty degree of
political toughness, we remember
her chiefly for her closets full of
shoes. It is difficult in fact to know
where the true Imelda is; we have
seen her primarily in a succession
of images which clearly show her as
the typical Bad Lady-she spends
too much money, she is bossy when
she ought to be quiet, she is pushy
and managerial, she is temperamentally unstable.
If we move quickly past Donna
Rice and Fawn Hall and Jessica
Hahn, and admittedly there are
some distinctions that could be
made among them, we could look
in passing at Tammy Bakker, smiling bravely at her husband's side,
the smeary ideal of Southern
womanhood, Snopes style. Of
course, she was great copy. Sinclair
Lewis couldn't have made her up if
he had tried all his life. Domestic-

ity, piety, loyalty, sweetness and
light-she made a long list of qualities look bad. So we had plenty of
her, what with one thing and
another.
If we were tempted to think that
surely motherhood must be a role
in which women could know what
to do and how to behave, we had
the Baby M case to contend with.
Watching Mary Beth Whitehead
and Elizabeth Stern go head to
head over whose baby it should be,
who was "fit" and who wasn't, who
knew the words to the appropriate
nursery rhyme and could send the
infant to Radcliffe, was a pretty depressing sight. No argument that
either side could make was a good
argument. If we were looking for
the image of the ideal mother we
didn't get it, unless that now means
the one who can hire the canniest
lawyer.
Then, of course, since we like
our characters good or bad, nice or
nasty, we got lots and lots of political wives. Here again smiles were
de rigueur, as was the inoffensive
suit, the pearl necklace, the gold
knot earrings, the pleasant shoes,
and the 2.3 children, all smiling.
Perhaps they like it, and so one
shouldn't feel sorry for them, all
having to match some PR consultant's checklist under "Candidate,
Wife." Some of them smiled
bravely, some exuberantly, some
shyly, some bouncily, some soberly-but there they all were ...
off to the side of the picture, not
exactly out of focus, hair back from
the eyes, teeth straight, not one of
them overweight or loud or drunk
or intelligent or cranky or anything
that anyone could object to. And
why is this? Why does anyone care
a bit about a presidential candidate's wife?
Well, here we are back at the
Reagans again. Of all the egregious
examples of the wife as appropriate
appendage, we had to look over
and over and over again at Nancy
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Reagan. The apotheosis of the perfect smile, all the time. Her contributions to the public welfare?
About on a par with speaking for
the Apple Pie Association. Cheerful, supportive (an occasional dustup like the one over Donald Regan,
but never mind), adoring, trustful,
not a worry in her pretty little head
as long as Ronnie is running the
show.
Is this why we need those public
good women permanently attached
to public men? Are they to be
exemplars of us as citizens? Trustful, adoring, passive-Daddy will
take care of everything. Isn't he
wonderful? What a big, strong
Man. Why does our public life
seem more and more to resemble
old movies?
It must be one of the more

amazing aspects of life in the new
Soviet Union to see a Russian version of this phenomenon . The
press loved this business: see the
battling first ladies turn the summit
into a regular feminine catfight.
Girls will be girls.
These public versions of famous
women, however, do not mean an
improvement in women's status in
public life. Sadly, they simply reiterate the ancient Lilith-Mary
dichotomy, in which women are
either too bad or too good for the
real world in which active, important, real things happen. When our
most potent images of women
today are still looking like Anne
Baxter in All About Eve, or like
Donna Reed in It's a Wonderful Life,
women still have a long, long way
to go.
Cl

Cats in the High Rises
of lzmir
Cats in the high rises of Izmir
plummet off the balconies.
Cats suddenly in mid-air going
six storeys down, or twenty,
it's all the same. One crouches
and thinks the pigeon within
reach, a quick leap to a railing
and a snatch. One spys a butterfly at its height and forgets
the edge that is forever. "Look!
a cat falling out of the sky,"
a child cries. But not all cats
die that take the plunge. Some
hit awnings and bounce into other
lives. Some come down through
trees, grateful for the little
green fingers that abide. And
some, a rare few, gripped to their
prize pigeon or butterfly, fly.

The Joy of Sleaze
James Combs
Wandering through a videotape
rental store the other day, I thought
of Jose Ortega y Gasset. Ortega's
book The Revolt of the Masses is still
a work worth pondering, and a
tape rental store is a good place to
ponder objections to democracy.
Ortega was a brilliant Spanish
philosopher who was representative
of the aristocratic critique of the
rise of democratic civilization, such
as it is. The "revolt of the masses"
augured the rise to power not only
of the many, but also the principle
of the many, what I like to call the
logic of a popular society.
Ortega y Gasset and other aristocratic critics of "mass society" understood-and much dislikedwhat was only dimly understood at
the beginning of the democratic
and egalitarian revolutions of the
past two centuries: that the
sovereignty of the people has not
only political but also economic and
cultural consequences. The logic of
a popular society dictates that politics becomes populist, at least in the
sense of catering to popular whim
and style. Economics are under
pressure not only to create prosperity but also the objects of mass
consumption. And culture is less

Frank Polite
When not wallowing in sleaze, James
Combs teaches Political Science at Valparaiso University.
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and less the province of elite guardians and more and more the
product of the common denominators of the mass marketplace.
Consider, for a moment, just one
aspect of this process: popularity. A
society based on the principle of
the popular suggests the selection
of those who are to lead or be
acclaimed on the criteria of widespread popularity. Popular heroes,
villains, and fools are all people we
love to love, love to hate, and love
to laugh at. Those who would be
President, or the king of comedy,
or on the cover of People magazine
tend to be personalities who seek
public affection, notoriety, or
plaudits.
Their demon is popularity, and
they are most alive when they are
the objects of collective attention.
Their fear is not so much being out
of action or out of power as being
out of sight. They are constrained
to not do those things that would
make them unpopular. Playing to
the crowd is the source of their
strength and indeed the determinant of their being. They do not
vindicate tradition, they vindicate
self. But they obey the canons of
popular logic: they are creatures of
our collective imagination, ephemera of public opinion, whose very
existence depends upon the whims
of a fickle audience whose play
with new kaleidoscopic visions of
self focuses their attention elsewhere. They are the public flotsam
and jetsam of the postmodern Protean self.
A mini-industry exists to cater to
our failing memory of the formerly
famous: where they are now, and
how could we have ever been taken
with them? Remember President
Morris
Udall,
the
Smothers
Brothers, Robert Vesco, Troy
Donahue and Sandra Dee? Where
are they now? Who knows and who
cares?
The aristocratic critics of the exFebruary, 1988

pansion of the democratic principle
to every area of life may have been
a bit too hard on the rise of the
Great Unwashed, but they do have
a point worth considering in a
popular age. (I am tempted to take
Vico's ancient conception of history
one better: we descend from mythical ages of the gods, to heroic ages
of aristocratic authority vested in
institutions, to popular ages of the
vulgar with power vested in public
opinion.) We are reluctant to
criticize a god-term such as "democracy" in a country where it has
taken such widespread root, but we
are only now beginning to see some
of the long-term effects of mass society and democratic order.

We are reluctant to
criticize a god-term like
democracy in a country
where it has taken
such widespread root.
Politically, the dangers of demagoguery and instability have always existed; but what we are more
aware of now is the potential of
government that is mediocre and
irresponsible by design. Democratic
masses often fear excellence, and
seek in leaders not cream but dishwater. Further, it is easy for such
governments to get into the habit
of avoiding painful choices because
they are unpopular. Our next President, taking a hard look at the balance sheets, will be faced with that
choice, and may eventually go
down in political flames for
suggesting draconian remedies.
The economic consequences of a
popular society include not only
catering to consumer whims, but
also a tendency towards tawdry
products that are quickly discarded,
reinforcing the ethos of a "throwaway society" where not only every
thing but also every relationship

becomes dispensable. In such a
popular economy, obsolesence and
waste, both of products and of
people, become an important and
ever-growing feature justified as
necessary for producing the greatest good for the greatest number.
But it is on democratic culture
that the aristocratic critics vented
the most contempt and scorn. As a
popular principle·, culture becomes
something mediated by the exploitation of fashion and desire. It becomes the province of a popular
aesthetic, something created for its
popularity-appeal across a public-rather than its inherent beauty.
A popular aesthetic is blatantly
exploitative, and it is here the purveyors of popular culture leap to
their own defense by arguing that
they are giving people what they
want. The aristocratic critics of old,
as well as their descendants among,
oddly enough, both neo-Marxists
and neo-conservatives, are quick to
agree: giving people what they
want is precisely what they fear.
Both Left and Right believe in
aesthetic standards and what used
to be called "moral uplift," although what people should appreciate and what kind of morality
should be upheld they part company on, to say the least. But both
sides to this debate do sense that
democratic culture has superseded
either restraint or direction, and
that authority has transferred from
ideology or institution to popular
will: whatever is popular, is right.
It is such an assertion of popular
authority that has always made
those who claim commitment to the
principle of democracy lose their
nerve: yes, but what if the hoi polloi
choose to enjoy things that we find
to be, uh, distasteful?
It is here that I must obey my
populist and libertarian instincts,
and defend a bit of popular cultural choice as a legitimate corollary of economic and political
choice. Dialecticians can make dis25

tinctions about why these different
areas of modern life are not
equivalences, but I feel sure that
many people do not see it: if I can
vote for whomever I want, and buy
whatever I want, why can't I watch
whatever I want?
As a popular principle, such logic
is impeccable. But what if people
want to watch things that are bad
for them? Well, it can be argued alternatively that Ronald Reagan and
franchise food are also bad for
them, but nobody would suggest
that people should be stopped
from choosing those things. Both
propaganda
and
Presidential
McDonald's ads may be no less
exploitative or kitsch than what one
finds in tape rental stores or
magazine racks. If both politics and
economics are exploitative, then
why should we expect that culture
would be otherwise? Perhaps the
essence of democracy is the right of
the people to choose who or what
they will be exploited by.
Indeed, I would press the argument to a point that would make
even John Stuart Mill nervous. The
popular culture explosion in this
century-exploitative,
ungenteel,
often outrageous-has served several aesthetic and social functions.
For one thing, it has scrambled aesthetic distinctions between high and
popular art, highbrow and lowbrow, what is worth appreciating
and what is not until such time as
someone has the power to enforce
standards. Such an atmosphere
stimulates much lively debate over
the status of aesthetics, and probably even gives impetus to artistic
creativity.
If much of popular culture is
bad and should be condemned, ignored, or banned, then the guardians of cultural standards should
say why convincingly. It must be
conceded that they do not lack for
instances of massive bad taste in
our culture: wrestling, strip joints,
tattoo parlors, romance novels ,
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Elvis imitators, demolition derbies,
girlie magazines, wet T-shirt contests, velvet art.
Yet bad taste needs to be defended. If the First Amendment
does not defend bad taste , it defends nothing at all. If there is any
basic democratic cultural right, it is
the right of vulgarity. If there is
any creative stimulus that emerges
from the miasma of popular culture, it is the creativity born of unrespectability.

Yet bad taste needs to
be defended. If the
First Amendment does
not defend bad taste, it
defends nothing at all.
High art, standards of aesthetic
distinction, and even cultural snobbery could not exist without popular taste. When they merge (as
with, say, films such as Chinatown,
art such as that of Duane Hanson ,
or the music of Harry Chapin),
they even offer hope of a blending
of critical and popular appreciation. But such appreciation proceeds on the knowledge of the
truly bad, cheap, irresponsible, and
offensive. I suggest that we not
only need courses in the appreciation of art and literature and
music, but also of sleaze. We need
to educate people in the joy of
sleaze.
I define sleaze as those popular
creations that are epitomes of bad
taste, made purely for exploitative
motives, and without the slightest
pretense of enduring value. Let us
return to our tape rental store.
Ortega y Gasset would no doubt
point to the pornographic section,
and he would be right: here is the
extreme form of sleaze, the stuff
that tests the limits of tolerance and
demonstrates the lure of the
obscene. Anyone who examines the

statistics of videotape rentals knows
that pornography 1s downright
popular.
Why this is so is inadequately understood . It is surely not merely
availablity or novelty; pornography
has been and apparently always will
be around , with or without censorship. But at least in prelapsarian
days it had the thrill of being surreptitious. Now easy availability
doesn't lessen consumption, and
the supply seems inexhaustible.
This is for me not so much shocking as puzzling: why do people
want to watch incredibly boring
and repetitious rituals of graphic
sex? Are their own sex lives so
awful that this is more exciting? Do
people prefer to watch sex than
risk engaging in it?
We do not fully understand why
so many people exercise such bad
taste , but a case can be made, given
the logic of popular choice, that
such a choice is their business. But
it does edge us uncomfortably close
to the demonics of sleaze.
Aside from porn, popular sleaze
is more preposterous than sinister,
and indeed now an object of nostalgic celebration. A glance at video
catalogs reveals the availability of
many of the more delightful products of Hollywood's "poverty row"
studios that cranked out the fare
for serials, drive-in audiences,
cheap theaters-all in all the sleazy
fringe
of moviemaking.
The
catalogs suggest the wide range and
interest in the varieties of sleaze.
In the 1930s, you and your pals
could have snuck off to see the
marvelous Reefer Madness, a cautionary tale about marijuana way
ahead of Judge Ginsburg; now you
can watch it on tape or catch it on
the college "camp" film festivals ,
along with Child Bride and High
School Girl. You can also obtain the
B-serials kids growing up in the
1940s enjoyed so much: 12 to 15
episodes of awful acting, incredible
escapes, cheap sets and costumes,
The Cresset

with titles like Zombies of the Stratosphere and Radar Men from the Moon,
with "Commando Cody, Sky Marshal of the Universe." They were
great. In the Fifties, you would hit
the drive-ins to catch the nowclassic teenpics such as Don't Knock
the Rock and I Was a Teenage
Werewolf Later on you could thrill
to the immortal Blood Feast and
2000 Maniacs, still popular rentals.

Sleaze is dying of
respectability. They are
taking the joy out of it.
It is acquiring an aura
of terrible harmlessness.
You can enJOY the entire sleaze
subgenre
of
women-in-chains
movies, from the trend-setting The
Big Doll House to the recent Slave
Girls from Beyond Infinity. The venerable tradition of the sleaze movie
has recently been revived by
Troma Studios, with such contributions to the art as The Toxic Avenger,
I Was a Teenage TVTerrorist, and Demented Death Farm Massacre. Troma
is on the ramparts of sleaze,
exploiting our every guilty pleasure
and childish desire for cheap
thrills.
Unfortunately, the glory days of
sleaze may be passing. For one
thing, sleaze is in. There are now
societies, festivals, and awards for
the celebration and study of sleaze.
The raw insouciance of sleaze may
be destroyed by the students of
cinema taking it seriously, or by
Yuppie consumers making it selfconscious. Recent tiresome parodies
such as Reform School Girls and The
Class of Nuke 'Em High suggest
exhaustion of the sleaze mystique.
At the Cannes Film Festival,
there is a corollary festival that last
year showed Assault of the Killer
Bimbos and Surf Nazis Must Die. Chicago has a Psychotronic Film SociFebruary, 1988

ety that shows such classics as
Switchblade Sisters and School Girl
Ninjas. The Golden Turkey Awards
of Michael Medved give stamps of
sleazy approval to various videotapes. There are various collections, such as Sleazomania and the
"Cool Ghoul" Zacherley's Horrible
Horror. There is an off-Broadway
parody entitled Vampire Lesbians of
Sodom.
All of this has the smell of death
about it. They are killing sleaze not
by making it an object of scorn,
which it needs to retain its vitality,
but rather by making it an object of
approval. To paraphrase Noah
Cross, like whores, politicans, and
ugly buildings, sleaze is now becoming venerable by lasting so long

and at last seeming oh, so delightful in retrospect.
Sleaze is dying of respectability.
They are taking the joy out of it.
Like everything else reduced to
being an object of nostalgia, sleaze
is acquiring an aura of terrible
harmlessness. It is well on the way
to losing its prurient interest, and
in danger of acquiring socially redeeming value.
Ortega y Gasset would no doubt
argue that giving respectable status
to sleaze is another symptom of our
descent into barbarism, tolerating
the cheap, irresponsible, and tawdry, and indeed even exalting it as
worthwhile,
something to be
amused by. Gibbon had thought
that freakishness in the arts was

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway VI
(After Lao Tzu)

10.
Everything I write is true,
Also simple to understand.
To follow it is likewise
Easy,
Yet when someone glimpses the truth
And how to live it,
Alas, he turns the truth back into words.
Why can he not leave the word flesh?
11.
She would have been a decent woman
If someone had held a gun to her everyday,
Or would she have grown even colder?
Nothing is ever really gained by force,
Even the force of love,
Especially the force of love
Called death.

Travis DuPriest
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one of the signs of the decay of
Roman civitas, the sense of standards of public and private cond uct, and of gravitas, the ability to
distinguish between the serious and
the playful. There is a good bit of
that in our current condition, I
think, and something else too: our
astonishing ability to legitimate anything, to tolerate anything, to acquiesce in everything.
Our easy acceptance of the sleazy
extends to the pornography of
power in politics and economics.
Gary Hart becomes Son of Nixon,
Michael Deaver and Ivan Boesky
proclaim their lack of cu lpability,
Gordon Liddy and O liver North
enrich themselves on the lecture
circuit. Having eliminated shame
and guilt, everything after a decent
interval becomes respectable. Nixon
becomes rehabilitated as a sage,
Boesky and North become folk
heroes, Irangate is brushed off as a
"mouse," Hart is applauded by
high school students for refusing to
answer The Question.

Our easy acceptance of
the sleazy extends to
the pornography of power
in politics. Gary Hart
becomes Son of Nixon.
It is, I suppose, our Protean
character: like a sponge, we can absorb everything. Sleaze, be it lowbrow movies or insider trading or
political irresponsibility, no longer
has an air of opprobrium. Those
who deal in political hype or junk
bonds are as much epitomes of bad
taste as Bloodsucking Freaks, are as
exploitative as any sleazebag horror
flick producer, and can make no
more pretense to enduring value
than Chain Gang Women. Such figures are giving sleaze a good name.
Ilsa, Harem Keeper of the Oil Sheiks,
••
should be outrage d .
••
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Les Vampires

Reconsidered
Richard Maxwell
On the left: a wide, cobbled street
lined with lamp-posts and leafy
trees. The .street curves around at a
sharp angle, entering the page at
the bottom left-hand corner, exiting at the upper-left hand corner.
A lamp-post stands at the center of
the curve, black, ornamental. Apparently it is there as a marker for
traffic. Cars are to route themselves
around one side or the other,
though-at the moment-there are
no cars (or perhaps just one, disappearing in the distance).
On the right: Two heavy black columns, spaced about six feet apart.
We can imagine them lamp-posts
but this is not certain since we are
unable to see their tops. In any
case they define the curve of the
sidewalk and shadow the curve of
the street. Between them a heavyset man is frozen in profile. He
walks briskly, wearing a sort of
messenger's hat. In front of him,
and just passing the nearest column, is a woman whose face is
shadowed, almost indecipherable.
She wears a black dress. Her right

Richard Maxwell teaches English at
Valparaiso University and writes regularly on Film for The Cresset. He is
also chairman of the Film Studies program at VU.

arm Is extended to the side,
perhaps touching the column. Is
the column a mailbox? If she is indeed dropping a letter in the mailbox slot, then that action is made to
seem at once public and secretive.
She moves among the black verticals of the scene, a black vertical
herself. A moment from now she
will disappear, curving with the
sidewalk and street, exiting where
they entered. The letter-assuming
there is one-will go on its way, following a route less visible than
hers.
A photograph of this vaguely disturbing tableau appears in Richard
Roud's Cinema: A Critical Dictionary
(New York: Viking Press, 1980),
pp. 356-357. Find the book. Look
at the photo for a while, taking
care to savour the obvious period
details, the grainy but evocative
texture of what is evidently the enlargement of a film frame. Then
imagine a movie composed of pictures like this one, pictures, of
course, set in motion and connected by a plot. Your curiosity
cannot but be provoked. You may
even want to view the work whose
existence is implied by this mysterious image. In that case you will
have to search out Louis Feuillade's
wonderful Les Vampires.
Les Vampires (1915), a serial in ten
installments about the exploits of a
gang of Parisian jewel thieves, has
always had something of a reputation. A vant-garde filmmakers contemporary with Feuillade thought it
a vulgar concession to mass tastebut then there were rebels within
the avant-garde camp, directors
like Luis Bunuel who perceived in
Feuillade's work the expression of
"une realite insolite" (an unusual
reality).
It is easy to see why Bunuel was
fascinated-and why his approach
to the film has been passed down
so easily to subsequent commentators, Richard Roud included. 1 No
one who has sat through Les VamThe Cresset

pires will forget the moment when
Satanas' cannon first rolls out from
behind the mantlepiece in a little
Montmartre flat; or when the gang
is discovered in black body stockings skulking over the roofs of
Paris, with Notre-Dame towering in
the background; or when the
notorious Irma Vep makes her
reappearance at the Howling Cat
cabaret after her apparent exile to
Algeria. Even apparently nondescript scenes, like the shot of Irma
described above, possess a strange
poignancy: they generate more
feeling, more mystery, than a
hundred such vignettes from later
movies in the vein of intrigue and
mystery.
Though Feuillade's political and
religious opinions were conservative, he seems-despite himself-to
have fashioned a surrealist epic. Les
Vampires apparently suggests that
everyday life is full of inexplicable
forces, working on us without our
conscious knowledge; it revels in
bizarre imagery that wells up out of
nowhere; it presses the notion of
the criminal as a kind of artist and,
by a typical surrealist twist, the artist as a kind of criminal. We get
our thrills from the notion that
Feuillade unwittingly wandered into
this territory; as Roud puts it, in an
essay from Cinema: A Critical Dictionary, Feuillade's films are compelling
because of "the tensions set up ...
between his consciously held views
... and the fascination he found in
women like Irma Vep."
So Roud-and so the rest of ushave supposed. The supposition is
sensible, I think, and in some respects quite near to the spirit of Les
Vampires, but recently I began noticing another movie within the one
everybody has been praising since

'As director of the New York Film
Festival, Roud has been particularly
influential in bringing Les Vampires to
America; indeed, the film might
never have been exhibited here were
it not for his efforts.
February, 1988

its rediscovery in the early 1940s: a
movie created not so much by its
viewers, especially by viewers like
Bufi.uel, or by its critics, especially
critics like Roud, as by the conscious intention of the director.
The story of how this second
film emerged is worth hearing,
even for readers who have never
seen Feuillade's epic. It shows that
a critical tradition can shape the
way we receive works of art; it
presses home the importance of
that obscure figure, the film archivist and restorer; it gives us, in
the last analysis, a work more
puzzling and more powerful than
the version of Les Vampires many of
us have learned to love.
The crucial point is this: every
time a print of Feuillade's masterpiece arrives on these shores, the
film is longer, a bit more complete.
As recently as the mid- or late
Seventies, in the essay already
quoted, Roud supposed that "the
inter-titles for the film ... long ago
vanished"; he went on to argue
that "this is all to the good since
present-day audiences are more
sophisticated as to film narrative
than audiences in 1915. We really
don't need a title to say 'The Next
Day.'"

It is received critical doctrinecorrect as far as it goes-that Feuillade had a brilliant visual imagination, that he was supremely excellent at telling a story in pictures.
This is surely Roud's point. On the
other hand, to dismiss the words
ahead of time, to assume that they
make no difference, turns out to
have been rather brash. The latest
version of Les Vampires, shown at
the New York Film Festival during
September 1987, included those
supposedly vanished intertitles.
There were a few hitches in the
presentation, largely due to an unfortunate young person who was
assigned the task of translating the
words and failed all too often.
All the same, the new Vampires

demonstrated the importance of titles to Feuillade's cumulative accomplishment. Given access to narration and dialogue previously
withheld, we discovered that we
were watching a new film. 2 To confront Les Vampires fully restored
was to realize that it is less a delirious surrealist collage bursting from
the subterranean recesses of a repressed mind than it is a vast novel,
extravagant but also sober, impulsive but also purposeful.
The film's new effect can be
suggested through a brief look at
one of its ten episodes. I focus on
"La Bague qui tue" (The Ring That
Kills) because, as the second installment, it sets the tone of much that
follows. For the sake of clarity, cues
from the previously unavailable intertitles will be italicized.
"La Bague" begins at what Feuillade describes as an elegant and expensive club. Seated to the side of a
table in the foreground, the Count
of Noirmoutier is reading his newspaper. He notes a column of backstage gossip: a ballet, "Les Vampires," is to be performed tonight
by Marfa Koutiloff, whom "all
Paris" knows is the fiancee of
Philippe Guerande. The Vampires
hate publicity. They have been getting more than their share from
Philippe, a newspaper reporter.
Now his girlfriend is aiding and
abetting him. As the Count reads, a
sleazy-looking club member detaches himself from a group in the
2

Like earlier works in the literary
tradition from which it derived
(Eugene Sue's Les Mysteries de Paris
would be an outstanding example),
Les Vampires is pervaded by written
words: telegrams, letters, business
cards, etc. In a sense, then, t:ven the
prints without titles provide us with
generous word clues. However, my
primary concern here is not for the
words within the images but the
words which comment on the images.
The distinction between these two
kinds of verbal guides needs further
thinking-out, something I'm not
going to attempt at the moment.
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background. He passes a ring to
the Count, informing him that the
slightest scratch is fatal.
If we have not done so before,
we recognize that Noirmoutier is
the Grand Vampire himself in one
of his many disguises. Just before
Marfa's performance he presents
her with the ring. She dies on
stage, in the middle of the Vampire
ballet, as the Count watches.
Philippe, who is there also, recognizes the Count as a Vampire and
follows him to the abandoned fortifications outside Paris where Noirmoutier's confederates kidnap him.
They decide to kill him according
to an elaborate ritual (they will be
linked by crime, "lier par le crime").
Before this execution can be accomplished, however, the police arrive. They manage to shoot and kill
one Vampire, the Grand Inquisitor
(all the others escape through a
trap door which they lock behind
them). The dead man proves to be
the sleazy fellow who originally
gave Noirmoutier the ring. He is
identified as the President of the Supreme Court (" Cour de la Cassation,"
not an exact counterpart of the
American Supreme Court but ...
close enough for our present purposes.)
Philippe observes that this victim
is not really so important; he was
only a supernumerary, a cor~uror's
confederate, an ally in trickery (the
French word, "comparse," has no
exact English
equivalent but
suggests a certain amount of contempt). He then makes a gesture
that will recur through the film as
a sort of leitmotif: holding both
hands out as though to grab at
something-which
then
slips
through his fingers.
Some of the cues from the intertitles add little. We know that the
ring is poisoned from the title of
the episode and, of course, from
Marfa's eventual death. Others
have the effect of underlining. We
can see how elegant and expensive
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the Count's club must be-there is
a huge fireplace in the background
with carved storks in relief-but
having the characterizing adjectives
allows us to focus on these qualities
more exclusively.
A third sort of cue articulates
ideas that are present but (extremely) latent. It is useful for us to
know why the Vampires are killing
Philippe: not just as a means of revenge (that motive will become central later in the film) and not just
as a random act of violence but
rather as a way of affirming their
community, their bonds with one
another. This notion of the Vampires as a little society within a society will run throughout all ten
episodes, allowing Feuillade to pose
fundamental questions about social
contracts and social agreements.
Finally-perhaps most importantly-there are cues which give
us vital information otherwise unprovided. "La Bague qui tue" moves
from an elegant and expensive club to
a hideout of the Vampires, yet we
find the .same people in both
places. Most especially, we discover
the President of the Supreme Court,
who has a secret identity as another
and more sinister sort of judge.
The New York audience for the

fresh print of Les Vampires laughed
raucously when the line about the
Supreme Court was translated for
them. This may have been because
the Bork nomination was in the
news, but there is, of course, a better reason to find Feuillade's words
remarkable. He has gone out of his
way to suggest that there is corruption at the very top of French society. One wants to discover why a
conservative Catholic Monarchist
would make this sort of extravagant claim: imagine a contemporary American film directed by
(say) John Milius which implied
that William Rehnquist was an
agent of Libyan terrorists, then
showed him lying dead in CabriniGreen, slaughtered by the FBI.
We begin to understand that the
much-vaunted subversiveness of Les
Vampires is not altogether subliminal, but must have a planned and
intentional role in the film, however unexpected it may be. We
start to become interested in the
circumstances-this was, after all,
the first year of the Great Warthat might have brought Feuillade
to this peculiar juncture in his
career, in his relation to the Third
Republic, and perhaps even in his
thinking about the future of civili-
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zation.
There's a lot more I want to
know about Feuillade's early films
and about France in the first decades of our century before I venture my own solution to the puzzle.
Much of the pre-Vampire Feuillade
is now being studied for the first
time. 3 The history of the Third Republic is, of course, well-known:
the Dreyfus affair, and the backlash against anti-republicans that
followed it may figure here, as well
as the terrorist gangs often cited
when Les Vampires is discussed.
For the purposes of this essay, it
is perhaps enough to cite a single
due--once again, from an intertitle. The word "comparse," glossed
above, implies a theatrical metaphor observable elsewhere in "La
Bague" (e.g., when Marfa dances).
Everyone in Les Vampires-heroes
and villains alike-is obsessed with
creating illusions, doing tricks , putting on a show.
It is possible that the unspeakable reality of World War I has
pointed Feuillade towards this notion of his society as a kind of huge
audition, with the players getting
more and more out of control,
more liable to mix their play-acting
with real violence, real death. He
would not be the only right-wing,
high-church type to experience the
destruction of the old Europe on
these terms. I can think of a prominent parallel: Eliot laboring on The
Waste Land, a Jeremiad-reshaped
by Jacobean drama-against the
depredations of modern culture.
In any case, whatever the historical significance of Les Vampires may
prove to be, the archivists have presented us with a film which can
never again be seen as a mainly unconscious work, a nightmare despite itself. The surrealists loved
the fi lms of Feuillade, but loved
them as the expression of a collec-

tive,
therefore
unattributable
dream . Irma strolling down the
sidewalk expressed more than
Feuillade knew, or knew that he

knew . We now begin to understand
that Les Vampires belongs to Feuillade: that its dreams are dreamt on
purpose.
••

••

The Lazarus Reflex
Today a woman draws blood from me,
The simplest lab test, and I pale
And sweat and start the falling forward
Humiliation of panic. "Are you ok?"
She says, meaning "Of course not"
Or "Who is this fool?" and I answer
"Yes," lying like a salesman, someone
Whose last dream drove him over a railing,
His car launched in a hopeless arc.
She's playing the Top Forty Countdown,
#27, a tune I've been hearing
For months suddenly tumbling
Off the play list. She breaks
The ammonia capsule and, jerked,
Upright, I see the next patient
Staring at me, his face thinned
By God knows what, and I'm ashamed
Enough to let loose my panic jokes:
The stress test faints, the flu shot
Collapses, all of those quizzes
For the Lazarus reflex, their hammers
On my knees of fear, something else
Mysterious, holding my leg still
Or letting it jerk, and never
A comment from the doctor,
Whichever patient I choose to be.

Gary Fincke

3Richard Abel addresses this subject
in an essay for the Fall, 1987 issue of
Postscript.
February, 1988
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The Soft Answer
Dot Nuechterlein
It is important that you understand the background . I was mad .
No, that isn't strong enough : I was
white-hot, boiling over, furious,
MAD!
Someone had stolen something
of mine, something I had made,
something in which I had invested
not only my time and creativity, but
myself. All the evidence pointed to
it having been taken by an undergraduate, and a male at thatprobably someone engaged with
friends in a prank. So I was predisposed to be especially angry at
anonymous young men.
To work off some steam I went
to my favorite place, the indoor
track, to run a few miles. Mistake.
Not only was this the site of the
theft, so that every lap brought the
grievance to mind. But also, before
finishing even the first eighth-mile,
I heard him, that obnoxious kid
who had disturbed my peace on
several previous occasions. I knew
neither his name nor his face , but
the voice and the language were
immediately recognizable.
There is a screened-off section
next to the track where students
play pickup basketball, and he and
some buddies were there again.
Mosr people grunt or exclaim as
they shoot and score or miss, but
this particular individual seems to
punctuate every movement with an
expletive. And loudly.
My kids think I am a terrible
prude because they have never,
ever heard me use obscenities, and
I always object when they do. (Note
to friend with whom I had an argument a year ago about whether
children reflect their parents'
values: mine can swear with the
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best of them , and they learned it
on the parochial school playground, not at home.) It isn't so
much a moral question to me as
one of taste; people who cuss a lot
aren't bad, just lazy and lacking in
imagination. I am not shocked or
offended when I hear vulgar or
profane language, but a steady
stream of it quickly gets to be Irritating.
So here I was, running to
ameliorate my aggressive impulses,
while at the same time Mr. Loose
Lips had me feeling more peevish
by the second. It wasn't long before
I could picture this foul mouth as
the sort of person who would probably also stogp to ripping off things
that belong to other people. With
each reference to God or to sexual
perversion I got further from sanity.
After half an hour my legs
weren't ready to quit, but my
psyche sure was. Furthermore, I
had decided to take action. As
mentioned, this was not the first
time this guy's verbosity had shattered the airwaves in my presence,
and it would probably happen
again. Being one who rarely suffers
in silence, I headed for a confrontation.
I stepped behind the screen and
watched the four boys play. Fortunately, it being easier to chew out a
stranger than an acquaintance,
none of them looked familiar.
They played silently for a few minutes, aware of my observation, but
I knew that anyone with such a
habit of profanity could not control
himself for long.
Sure enough, I soon had my
man, and when they took a break a
short time later I called him over.
"Look," says I , "somebody back
here is a real garbage mouth, and
I suspect it's you . You know ," continues I, "most people swear now
and then , but you don't seem to be

able to draw a clean breath. This is
a public place," fumes me, "and the
rest of us shouldn't have to put up
with this nonsense, so please clean
up your act."
He looked at me for a split second, and then--do you know what
he did? Can you imagine what that
scoundrel, that young punk, had
the gall to do? He SMILED, and
very softly replied, "Okay."
Oh, the unfairness of it all. Here's
me, worked up to a lather, spoiling
for a knock-down-drag-out, wanting him to be either hostile or sullen so that I could spit out a little
more venom. And here's the kid,
absorbing my anger and coming
back with the perfect response. I
tried to hold back my smile until I
turned away, so that he couldn't
see that he had won. But he had.
Oh, do I hope I can remember
this the next time someone comes
after me! Proverbs tells us that a
soft answer turns away wrath, but I
have seldom experienced that.
Once, ages ago, when my husband
sniped at me over something I
thought unimportant, I said "it
takes one to know one," and we
both ended up laughing. (I tried
that another time without successhe was on to me. Especially since
we were engaged in The Fight, the
major issue that never gets resolved
but keeps on turning up over and
over; doesn't everybody have one
of those?) But things worth fighting about have always seemed to
me to be worth fighting about; I
speak softly in the sense I don't
scream or get loud much, but the
Proverbial soft answer has not been
part of my arsenal.
One of the things I like about
being around kids all the time is
that I tend to learn a lot from
them. This particular young manwhose face I cannot now recallhas provided me with a terrific lesCl
son. We'll see if it takes .
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